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In May 2014, it was discovered that Dezheng Resources, a Chinese trading company, 
had multiple warehouse receipts issued for metal stored in the ports of Qingdao and 
Penglai in Shandong province. Approximately 400’000 tons of alumina, aluminium and 
copper worth around $380 million were used to obtain $4.2 billion in financing from 18 
Chinese and 7 international banks. The fraud was discovered in the course of a 
government corruption investigation of a Party official. The warehouses have been put 
under lockdown and have not reopened since. 
A large part of the financing had been done in the form of commodity repurchase 
agreements, or repos. These instruments are ownership structures, in which title to the 
goods and risks pass from the trader to the financier for the duration of the transaction, 
as opposed to secured lending, in which the goods are pledged to the lender who has 
a security interest in them. Among the many lawsuits that followed the scandal, the 
most prominent one was Mercuria v Citibank that was expected to be a test of a key 
principle of repos, that of the true sale. 
The objective of this report is to study the consequences of the scandal for commodity 
repo financing. We start by examining the functioning of these instruments and the 
context in which the scandal happened. Based on that knowledge, we analyze how 
Qingdao has affected the use of repos and draw up recommendations regarding the 
legal and operational aspects of setting up these deals. 
We find that while in Mercuria v Citibank the issues of true sale and whether it is 
possible to contract out of attornment to effect delivery were not considered by the 
judge, the repo structure as such was upheld and remains fundamentally viable. In 
addition to complying with true sale, the structures should be reviewed by lawyers to 
ensure that they work across the jurisdictions governing the sale and repurchase 
contracts and that of the country where the goods are located. In order to reduce the 
risk of fraud, the lenders should have visibility over the goods’ origin and engage in 
financing of trading flows that serve to satisfy a real industrial or commercial demand, 
conduct due diligence on counterparties and warehouses, make use of collateral 
management agreements and actually visit the storage locations. It is critical not to 
deal on documentary basis only, but to be aware of the reality of the goods one 
acquires and the risks to which they are exposed.      
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1. Introduction 
In May 2014, reports emerged about a case of fraud involving metals in Qingdao, the 
world’s seventh largest port and China’s second busiest. Warehouse receipts for 
400’000 tons of base metals worth about $380 million at current prices were allegedly 
fraudulently duplicated to obtain multiple rounds of financing. On May 28, authorities 
ordered to seal off the Dagang bonded storage area in the port of Qingdao and a part 
of the port in Penglai, a city in the same province, on June 8. 
As the lenders identified their exposures, it turned out that 18 Chinese banks were 
facing potential losses of $3.2 billion. 7 International banks had exposures of $1 billion, 
the total amount of $4.2 billion meaning that 10-11 times more funds were raised than 
the metal stocks were worth. The exact quantities involved are unknown, since the 
warehouses have remained under lockdown until today. Some of the metal possibly 
never even existed. 
Fraud has always been an issue in trade finance and it is one that tends to become 
more prevalent in difficult times. In the 2015 ICC Global Trade and Finance Survey, 
18.5% of respondents indicated an increase in allegations of fraud linked to trade 
finance instruments compared to 2014, a development similar to that in 2008-2009 as 
commodity prices decreased across the board (ICC, 2015). There were fears that the 
scandal might be more widespread and could also affect Shanghai, the major center 
for metals trading in China, but it turned out to be limited to the ports of Qingdao and 
Penglai and perpetrated by just one company, Dezheng Resources. Nevertheless, the 
case struck me because of its magnitude and made me wonder just how this could 
have happened. What also made it interesting was a prominent lawsuit between 
Mercuria and Citibank that was expected to test the validity of the legal structure of 
commodity repurchase agreements. These financing instruments constituted the bulk 
of the transactions in question, which is why I decided to focus on them in particular. 
1.1 Research Question 
The objective of this bachelor project is to explore the consequences of the scandal. 
The research question can be formulated as follows: “What are the implications of the 
Qingdao metals scandal for commodity repo financing?” While writing the report, I 
realized that there were relatively few issues that concerned repos exclusively. A far 
greater number of them were relevant for inventory finance in China in general, be it 
with repos or secured lending. Given the repos’ importance in the case, I found that it 
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was more interesting to focus on this narrower topic, which allowed me to explore more 
in detail the functioning of these instruments and the technical legal issues around the 
passing of title, delivery and true sale, rather than to do the opposite: to discuss 
inventory finance broadly and only address repos as a secondary topic. 
1.2 Methodology 
This report contains three parts. First, we will first look into the functioning of 
commodity repos in order to understand the extent and the significance of the 
scandal’s consequences. Repurchase agreements are ownership structures in which 
title of the goods passes to the financier for the duration of the transaction. In our 
analysis, we will highlight their differences with the other type of inventory financing, 
secured lending, in which the goods are pledged to the bank. This will allow us to 
discuss the additional potential risks associated with ownership of the goods, as well as 
the possibilities for their mitigation. 
Then, we will present the sequence of the scandal’s events, as well as the context in 
which it took place. There are factors that had contributed to the rise in commodity-
backed financing in China and others that could have led some companies to commit 
warehouse receipt fraud. 
Finally, we will present and discuss the consequences of the scandal, for repos in 
particular as well as for metal financing in China in general and will formulate 
recommendations for addressing the legal and operational issues that arise with repos. 
Work on the report started by collecting information on the above topics in industry 
reports, as well as in financial and business journals. In the process, we drew up a list 
of questions that remained unanswered or elements that required further clarification or 
validation. These questions were used as the base for the interviews that constituted 
our primary research. The interviews were semi-structured, based on open questions 
with discussions that developed based on the interviewees’ responses (Qualres.org, 
2016). The transcripts are presented in Appendixes 4-9. They are much shorter and 
were based on notes when the person preferred the interview not to be recorded. 
Indeed, the Qingdao scandal is a sensitive topic given the magnitude of the event, its 
recency as well as the fact that investigations are still ongoing and once they are 
concluded further lawsuits are expected to follow. In some instances, this led the 
person to decline the invitation for an interview, especially when a business partner or 
a client was involved. Appendix 3 is a table that presents the results by providing an 
overview of topics or ideas that were mentioned by each person. The table is not like a 
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survey response database: if a topic is not marked, it means that the person has not 
mentioned it, so he could have agreed with the idea or not. Some views were 
expressed by several persons and are highlighted with color – there are ideas that 
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2. Commodity Repurchase Agreements 
In order to better understand the issues that arose following the Qingdao scandal, we 
will first examine how commodity repurchase agreements function. Starting with an 
overview, we will move on to the more specific aspects such as the legal, accounting, 
regulatory and so on. 
2.1 Overview 
Commodity repurchase agreements, or repos, are instruments used in commodity 
finance, specifically in inventory financing. In the course of their activities, trading 
companies acquire stocks of physical commodities that can be stored for various 
reasons, such as: 
 Pending an ordinary sale to a customer 
 Waiting for favorable changes in the market structure expected by the trader 
 Constituting stocks of the various components used in blending operations 
 Waiting to be transformed in a processing facility 
These stocks tie up the company’s capital. In order to improve liquidity, cash circulation 
and better manage the working capital, trading companies can have their stocks 
financed by banks or other financial intermediaries. There are two major techniques: 
secured lending, where the goods or the documents representing them (warehouse 
receipts) are pledged to the lender, and ownership structures (repos), in which the 
bank actually acquires the goods. 
Repos have been widely used with money market and fixed-income securities in the 
United States since 1917, long before commodity repos, and today they are a multi-
trillion US dollar market (McCormick, 2015). The Financial Times Lexicon defines a 
repo as: “a type of short-term loan (…), whereby the seller of a security agrees to buy it 
back at a specified price and time. The seller pays an interest rate, called the repo rate, 
when buying back the securities.” (Lexicon.ft.com, 2016). The following elements 
characterize this transaction: 
 It starts with a sale – title to the security or the goods, along with all rights, 
obligations and risks resulting from ownership, passes from the seller to the 
buyer. 
 The seller undertakes to repurchase the goods at a later time – as we will see, 
there can be variations as to the conditionality of the repurchase. 
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 The repurchase price – it is typically higher than the sale price, the difference 
being effectively the interest rate on the financing provided. 
 Despite being a sale and repurchase agreement in form, in substance the 
transaction is essentially a short-term loan. This has implications for the legal 
and accounting treatment of repos that we will examine, with differences across 
jurisdictions. 
Commodity repos were introduced by Merrill Lynch in 1991 and were known as 
"Commodity Inventory Purchase Obligations", or CIPOs: “agreements that allow Merrill 
Lynch to take title to your inventories until they're needed.” (Reichard, 1995). The figure 
below illustrates the basic principle: 
Figure 1 – A repo transaction 
 
 
2.2 Benefits and Risks 
2.2.1 Benefits for the trader 
Repos are attractive financing instruments, as they offer a range of benefits both to the 
“borrower” and the bank. Overall, inventory financing improves the company’s liquidity 
ratios, its use of capital and shortens the working capital conversion cycle. This is of 
particular importance for trading companies which are involved in a high volume, high 
turnover, low margin business. The table below provides a simplified example of the 
difference between a company financing its inventories with equity and one that was 
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Figure 2 – Impact of financing on revenues and profitability 
   
No financing 
80% inventory financed at 
3% p.a. interest 
Equity 100 USD mio 100 USD mio 
Financing 0 USD mio 400 USD mio 
Purchasing power 100 USD mio 500 USD mio 
Transaction duration 45 days 45 days 
Annual turnover 800 USD mio 4000 USD mio 
Profit margin 1%   1%   
Gross profit 8 USD mio 40 USD mio 
Finance costs 0 USD mio 12 USD mio 
Net profit 8 USD mio 28 USD mio 
Return on equity 8%   28% 
  
We see that the revenues increased fivefold (as the trader only financed one-fifth of its 
turnover) and the net profit more than tripled – the effect depends on whether the 
finance costs are greater than the profit margin, as well as on the transactions’ duration 
(how many times the trader turns his inventory in a year). A repo offers even more 
advantages because of the off-balance sheet treatment as inventories leave the 
trader’s books and are replaced by cash (Trade Finance, 2014b). However, this is 
subject to approval by the company’s auditor and we will see the requirements in 
section 2.4.2. Other characteristics of repos are primarily beneficial for the banks, but 
turn out to be advantageous for the traders as well, as they ultimately allow the 
financing costs to be lower. 
2.2.2 Benefits for the bank 
Compared to secured lending when the goods are pledged to the bank, ownership 
provides the bank with better protection in case of default. When financing with a 
pledge, depending on the jurisdiction governing the goods, the bank may first have to 
obtain a court decision authorizing it to effect the sale, which results in a loss of time. 
The sale might have to be carried out in a public auction, which can result in monetary 
losses as well. In contrast, being the owner of the goods allows the bank to sell them 
immediately when problems arise. Furthermore, the pledge is vulnerable under certain 
circumstances, such as the bankruptcy of the debtor which negates the security 
interest under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Finally, ownership is much 
easier to acquire than to properly create and enforce a security interest in goods. 
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These aspects seem to be accounted for in the regulatory treatment of repo 
transactions as reflected by the lower amounts of capital that the banks need to set 
aside. As a result, the costs of financing can be reduced by between 10 and 50 
percent, depending on the profile of the client and the commodity. Smaller trading 
companies with lower credit ratings (who would be penalized under a loan), as well as 
commodities with more developed, liquid markets could benefit from a bigger discount 
(Gulfbase, 2014). 
2.2.3 Risks of ownership 
Along with the benefits come the risks of ownership of commodities. Many of them are 
specific to dealing with physical goods and call for a high level of awareness and 
expertise – the trade finance / structured commodity finance department is oftentimes 
the only one in the bank that faces them. We will present the most relevant risks below, 
but how some of them are dealt with may have implications for the validity of the true 
sale. This is a key principle in ownership structures, failure to comply with which results 
in a risk of the transaction being recharacterized as an unsecured loan – we will 
therefore review them in greater detail in section 2.3.5. 
2.2.3.1 Acquiring title 
In sales transactions, the moment when title passes is agreed on by the parties in the 
sales contract, unless otherwise prescribed by the law (more on this in section 2.3.1. 
As the provisions vary widely from one legal system to another, the analysis in this 
report will be based on English law, unless specified otherwise). In addition to ensuring 
that the title passes from the trader to the bank properly, the first challenge is to track 
the origins of the goods and ascertain whether the client had clean title himself in the 
first place (Wynne, p.169). Where the commodity is coming from can make a big 
difference in terms of the risks the bank is taking, including that of fraud.  
For example, a batch of metal stored in a bonded (prior to customs clearance) 
warehouse in China may have been imported by the trading company after having 
being acquired directly from the smelter a couple of months ago. The bank has had a 
long-standing relationship with its client and the smelter is a well-known producer. The 
client is able to present his purchase contract and demonstrate that he had paid for the 
goods in full (if the bank financed that purchase it would have seen the money go out of 
its client’s account) and that there are no third-party interests in or charges on them. In 
this situation, the bank has visibility over the goods’ origin and the chain of ownership 
of the metal. 
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It would be a completely different case if the metal was acquired by the client from a 
small local metal trader, unknown by the bank. The client has his purchase contract, 
but he is not sure where did his seller obtain the metal from. It is known that the 
previous owner is a pure trading company that does not have production plants, is not 
part of a large industrial group and the goods most likely had passed through several 
intermediaries. In such a case, there are higher risks of the bank’s client having issues 
with the title that he acquired and it is not possible to trace the goods in a satisfactory 
way. The buyer is somewhat protected by the English Sales of Goods Act 1979, 
section 23: “When the seller of goods has a voidable title to them, but his title has not 
been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, 
provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.” 
(Legislation.gov.uk, 2016), but this may not be the case in other jurisdictions. 
We can see that the risk around title is therefore a function of: 
 the goods’ origin (whether they were coming directly from a producer or after a 
chain of transactions took place), 
 the counterparties involved (whether they are reputable and well-known), 
 the number of sales/purchases (the more transactions there were, the more 
difficult it is to track the passing of title), 
 and time – if the goods had been used for financing purposes for a significantly 
longer time than what is expected in an ordinary consumption cycle, in 
combination with the above factors there is a higher risk of fraud. 
In his interview, Mr. Ziegler emphasized the importance of the first two elements 
(Appendix 8). It is critical that the banks not only know their customers, but that they 
also know their customers’ suppliers and clients, truly understand their business and 
know which transactions are consistent with it. 
2.2.3.2 Market risks – price fluctuations 
Repos with financial instruments are usually conducted with low-risk (highest credit 
rating) money market and bond securities whose market value only fluctuates a little. In 
addition, a significant part of these transactions are very short-term, some of them as 
short as overnight (one business day). With commodity repos, the situation is the 
opposite: commodity prices are very volatile and maturities extend up to weeks and 
months, which means that at the time of resale, the prices may be significantly different 
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from those at the inception. The figure below illustrates the commodities’ risk and 
return profile compared to the other asset classes: 
Figure 3 – Returns and volatility of major asset classes 
 
Source: (Mauldin, 2006) 
The risk of price fluctuations can be dealt with in two ways. First, the purchase price 
can include a discount to market value in order to provide the bank with a security 
buffer. However, a large discount that makes the price deviate significantly from the 
goods’ fair (market) value can be problematic for the transaction’s true sale status 
(section 2.3.5). Unless the price of the forward leg of the repo is fixed from the start, the 
bank would have to hedge its price risk exposure by entering into short derivatives 
positions to offset its long physical one. 
2.2.3.3 Storage and insurance 
After acquiring ownership of the goods, the bank becomes responsible for their 
preservation. Ideally, it would have to arrange for the storage and insurance services 
independently, but this may not be the most practical solution (Wynne, p.174). 
Typically, the goods would already be stored in a warehouse and it would not be 
convenient to move them to another location because of the additional costs. However, 
whether the warehouse is operated or controlled by the trader or if he had contracted 
for these services with an independent company may have implications for the validity 
of the true sale and we will discuss them in the corresponding section. 
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Other risks include the deterioration of quality and the losses due to spoilage of 
perishable goods. This is more of a concern for agricultural commodities, such as 
wheat, barley, corn and soybeans. Although they can be stored for years under the 
right conditions, losses could quickly arise if there is a failure to maintain the required 
storage regime. Oil, its products and metals do not spoil as such, but can also suffer 
from losses in quality (oil products contaminated in tanks) or damage (hot briquetted 
iron that can self-ignite when piled incorrectly) (Belton, 2015). 
2.2.3.4 Liability to third parties 
Financing physical commodities results in a number of risks that are not encountered in 
financial repos. Specifically, damage to property and the environment can arise as a 
result of mishandling certain goods (Wynne, p.174). Commodities vary widely in their 
risk profile. Oil and its products, as well as chemicals can cause great harm directly as 
a result of leakage, combustion or explosion. Metals do not tend to be problematic, with 
exceptions such as mercury or uranium. Agricultural commodities, while not dangerous 
as such, can nevertheless cause harm when they are used for human or animal 
consumption and there are quality issues. For example, in 2008, the European Union 
restricted imports of Ukrainian sunflower oil after it was discovered that it was 
contaminated by mineral oil, possibly in storage tanks (Jones, 2008). The risks of third 
part liability can be mitigated through insurance. However, there is also the reputational 
risk of having financed the goods involved, with bad publicity that may harm the bank 
regardless of whether it owned the goods or they were only pledged in its favor. 
2.3 Legal Aspects 
2.3.1 Passing of title 
As a repo involves a sale and a subsequent repurchase of commodities, title will pass 
from the trader to the bank and conversely at the maturity of the transaction. This will 
be governed by the sales and purchase contract between the parties. In most 
jurisdictions, they are free to define the moment when title passes according to what 
best suits their needs. Should the contract be silent, however, most local laws provide 
a default position (Zonneveld, 2012). For example, in the United States and China, title 
passes at delivery (§2-401 US Uniform Commercial Code (LII / Legal Information 
Institute, 2016a), Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 133 (WIPO, 
1999)), while under English law, by default, title passes at the time of payment with 
which delivery is concurrent (Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 28 (Legislation.gov.uk, 
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2016)). In international trade there are indeed departures from the default law 
provisions as payment is often deferred. 
2.3.2 Delivery of goods 
A sale implies that delivery of goods will take place. Under English law, delivery may be 
effected by transfer of either actual or constructive possession. When it is actual, the 
goods are physically delivered to the buyer. Arguably, it is not practical for the bank to 
accept delivery of tens and hundreds of thousands of tons of metal, oil or agricultural 
products, unless it is involved in the physical commodity trading business itself and 
owns or leases warehouses or storage space. Precious metals (gold, silver, platinum 
and palladium) are an exception, as their value-to-weight ratio is very high compared to 
that of other goods. At current prices, a ton of copper is 13 times more valuable than a 
ton of soybeans or crude oil. Silver, however, is more than 1’500 times more valuable 
than oil and gold 117’000 times – a single standard 12.5kg gold bar is worth more than 
USD 500’000. Precious metals of huge value can therefore be stored effectively in a 
very small space. Bank vaults are sufficient for this purpose and actual delivery is 
practical, as the transport and storage costs only amount to a tiny fraction of the goods’ 
value: 
Table 1 – Differences in “value density” across commodities 
 
Sources: Finviz.com, Metric Conversion, Lme.com (2016a), U.S. Grains Council (2016) 
Most commodities, however, are stored in warehouses owned or leased by the trading 
companies, or operated by independent warehousing firms. With delivery by transfer of 
constructive possession, the goods do not have to move by an inch. It can be 
accomplished by handing over a title document that represents the goods, such as a 
Bill of Lading or a warehouse receipt (if recognized under the relevant law as a 
transferable title document) – known as “symbolic” delivery. Alternatively, if the goods 
are “in possession of” a third party, for example a warehouse operator (a bailee), that 
party may declare that it is holding the goods to the order of the recipient – known as 
attornment (Sale of Goods Act 1979, Section 29 (Legislation.gov.uk, 2016)). The word 
“possession” here simply means that the goods are kept by that person and equates to 
Commodity Price Units Price, USD/MT Value relative to Crude Oil
Gold 1275 USD/Troy oz 40'992'171      117354
Silver 17.13 USD/Troy oz 550'742           1577
Copper 4660 USD/MT 4'660               13
Soybeans 10.63 USD/bushel 391                  1.1
Crude Oil 47.85 USD/bbl 349                  1
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physical control. The following quotation illustrates the difference with constructive 
possession: “It is common ground (…) that, at the time of each sale, the goods in 
question were in the possession of a third party (one of the warehouse operators) as 
bailee for the seller, the seller having constructive possession of the goods.” (Bailii.org, 
2015b, §54). 
2.3.3 Title document status 
The status of documents representing the goods will determine the delivery mode that 
is possible under the repo. Once again, this may differ across legal systems. Under 
English law, a warehouse receipt is not a document of title (Monk and Turner, 2014). 
Merely handing them over to the bank therefore will not constitute a valid delivery of 
goods and attornment from the warehouse operator will be required in addition. This 
was one of the key issues in the Mercuria v Citigroup case that we will examine later 
on. However, there are exceptions when warehouse receipts can “acquire the status of 
title documents through trade custom or usage or by Acts of Parliament” (Antcliffe et 
al., 2011). One is the notable example of the LME warrants. Henry Bath, a leading 
warehousing firm, issues warehouse receipts that convey title to the goods as per an 
Act of UK Parliament from 1890 (Henrybath.com, 2016). On the other hand, warehouse 
receipts are indeed considered documents of title in the United States, as per the 
Uniform Commercial Code, §7-104 (LII / Legal Information Institute, 2016b), as well as 
in China (Moser and Yu, 2014).  
2.3.4 Lex situs 
In commodity trading, sales and purchase contracts are often governed by the English 
law, a jurisdiction elected because of the certainty offered by its long-dating case law, 
as well as proven impartiality when it comes to the treatment of parties in court. In a 
case where a company A based in country X is selling goods being loaded in a port in 
country Y to a company B based in country Z, such a jurisdiction constitutes an 
acceptable compromise. Indeed, in emerging markets, where a large part of the 
business is conducted, the legal systems may not be sufficiently practical and reliable if 
the interpretation and enforcement of the law is not clear. Furthermore, the local courts 
may treat the home country’s party more favorably as a matter of principle or because 
of corruption to which they are more vulnerable as well. 
However, in inventory finance, it is practically impossible to avoid the involvement of 
local laws, since the goods are stored in a warehouse in a given country for a certain 
period of time. In the case of Qingdao, the sales or purchase contract could be 
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governed by the English law, as was the case with Mercuria and Citigroup, but the laws 
of the PRC could also apply to the goods if the matter was brought before a Chinese 
court as a matter of non-contractual claims such as tort or civil liability. In addition, local 
laws may regulate their activities of warehouses, define their licensing requirements 
and the status of the documents representing the goods, such as warehouse receipts, 
and whether the parties can elect another jurisdiction to govern their contract. All this 
can lead to a situation in which different parts of a dispute could be heard by different 
courts which could arrive to contradicting conclusions (Mr. Hold, Appendix 4).  
Since several jurisdictions can apply to a transaction, the parties seek legal opinions 
from law firms prior to going ahead. In these reports, the lawyers comment on the 
feasibility of the deal: whether it would be in compliance with the legal systems 
involved, whether these systems work together, whether title could pass properly and 
so on (Mr. Hold). They are a critical step in setting up the deal and have to be 
requested on a regular basis because each transaction is unique. 
2.3.5 True sale and recharacterization risk 
While the repurchase structure involves sales of goods, it is important to remember that 
it ultimately remains a financing instrument. The business motivation behind a repo is 
to monetize one’s inventory while it is not needed and use the thus freed up funds in 
other business operations. At the repo’s maturity, the inventory will return to the 
“borrower” and he will have incurred a cost in the difference between the sale and the 
repurchase price. From an economic standpoint, this is similar to the interest paid on a 
loan advanced against the security of the commodity. There is therefore a difference 
between the form of the agreement (sales with transfer of ownership) and its substance 
(financing). Furthermore, since between the trading company and the bank the latter is 
less an expert in dealing with the commodity itself, there is an incentive for the lender 
to try and pass back to the trader as much risk and responsibility arising from 
ownership as possible through contractual arrangements. It is critical to ensure that 
such measures do not undermine the true sale principle. 
For example, when a lender has to take over the inventory following the borrower’s 
default or other problems, if the true sale principle was not complied with, the repo 
transaction may be recharacterized as a loan. The bank will no longer have ownership 
and will be considered to have attempted to take security over the collateral whose 
status will be examined to determine whether the security interest had been properly 
established. This is known as attachment and allows the lender to enforce his rights 
against the borrower. However, a second step, called perfection, is frequently required 
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in order to be able to enforce the security against third parties who may have claims on 
the collateral or against other creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Local laws may 
require additional actions to perfect the security such as registration of the pledge in a 
public registry. It is not likely that such measures would have been taken by the parties 
when setting up a repo deal, as the transfer of ownership through a sale does not 
require them. As a result, the lender may find itself in a position where his security 
interest would either not be enforceable in the absence of perfection, or non-existent 
altogether, depending on the jurisdiction (Wynne, p.176). 
Recharacterization defeats the very purpose of the repo – in particular, ownership is 
often much easier to acquire and document that a pledge. It also allows the lender to 
dispose of the collateral as soon as a default event occurs without going through the 
procedures prescribed by the local laws for security interests. In addition, the lender 
would have to reimburse to the borrower any sale proceeds in excess of the amounts 
owed (Wynne, p.168). For these reasons, repos are preferred in certain countries or 
contexts and indeed, comprised most of the financing deals involved in the Qingdao 
scandal (Curran, Inman and Iosebashvili, 2014). A table in Appendix 1 provides an 
overview of the major elements that can strengthen or weaken compliance with the true 
sale principle. Overall, the bank should assume its role of the goods’ owner to the 
greatest extent possible and not seek to pass responsibility and risks back to the trader 
(Wynne and Koshy, 2015). We can further comment on some of the points in the table: 
 Purchase price: there is a conflict between the recommendation to have it as 
close as possible to the market price and the bank’s interest to impose haircuts 
on collateral in order to have a buffer protecting it from market fluctuations. 
While margins and haircuts are the norm with secured lending, they are not 
desirable with repos. The bank should instead assume the price risks and take 
the necessary hedging measures. 
 Transaction duration: there have been cases of abuse of the repo structure 
when they were used primarily to embellish the balance sheet of the company 
and create an appearance of a healthier liquidity situation. We will expand on 
these issues in section 2.4.1 covering the accounting aspects of repos. 
 An option to repurchase: the fact that the trader only has the right, but not an 
obligation to buy back the inventory at repo’s maturity makes a big difference 
for the transaction’s form. It takes away the certainty that ownership of the 
goods will be recovered and introduces the possibility that the bank will keep 
them. Under these circumstances, the initial transfer of title acquires a more 
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sustainable status, because it will endure unless the trader chooses to exercise 
his call option. In the normal course of business, the bank does not wish to 
keep the goods, as its main activity is to provide finance and not to trade in 
physical commodities. In this context, in addition to being a buffer for price 
fluctuations, the lower price paid for the goods in comparison to prevailing 
market prices acts as an incentive for the trader to buy these stocks back. 
Finally, some banks are active in physical commodity trading as well (although 
the US banks have been exiting the business as of lately due to regulatory 
pressures) and they may actually be adequately equipped to deal with any 
goods that should remain in their ownership. In any case, the option to 
repurchase strengthens the structure and there is a “strong understanding” 
between the parties that it will indeed be exercised by the trader (Mr. Ziegler). 
 Different seller and re-purchaser: According to Wynne (p.180), this is the single 
most important point strengthening the true sale argument, so much that the 
structure could be upheld even if some other aspects are not in accordance 
with it. Mr. Hold explained that the issue is also whether the two legs of the repo 
are connected. In the repurchase contract, it should not be stated that the 
goods have to be those same goods that were sold. The wording should limit 
itself to saying: “we sell you back 500 tons of steel bars with specifications 
a,b,c,d” and the same in the sales contract. This way, the goods will indeed 
most of the time be the same ones, but it would just be a coincidence. Resale 
obligations could also be satisfied if another batch of goods meeting the 
description and quality specifications was delivered. 
There was a notable legal case on recharacterization – Welsh Development Agency v 
Export Finance Company, but it dealt with sales of book debts and not commodities 
(Sullivan & Worcester, 2015). It was held that a transaction could be recharacterized 
when the contract is a sham, that is, when it does not adequately reflect the intentions 
of the parties and if its terms do not allow to achieve the legal effects that they are 
targeting (swarb.co.uk, 2015). 
2.3.6 Bankruptcy proceedings 
Recharacterization has additional implications in the case of bankruptcy proceedings 
as there are significant differences between the treatment of secured lending and 
ownership structures. In the UK, secured loans are recognized and the pledged assets 
are segregated from the bankruptcy estate. However, this is not the case in the United 
States, where the Chapter 11 bankruptcy code Section 362 prevents a lender, even 
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secured, from “exercising remedies against the debtor or the lender’s collateral” – this 
is known as the automatic stay (McCollough and Gratton, 2014). Although in the case 
of a repo, the lender who would only have a contractual obligation to resell the 
commodity to the bankrupt entity, by virtue of the same Section 362: “the automatic 
stay would prohibit any action by the non-debtor to terminate a contract, to recover 
claims against the debtor or to offset mutual debts with the debtor” (Dunetz, 2012b). 
However, Section 556 exempts certain commodities and forward contracts that include 
repos from the automatic stay. As a result, the bank is no longer bound by its obligation 
to resell the goods to the trader and instead will be allowed to “liquidate” the contract by 
selling them onto the market. It will even be entitled to claim from the estate any 
damages resulting from an adverse difference between the contract price and that 
realized on the sale (Campbell, 2002, p.4). 
We can see that while repos are well-protected with regards to bankruptcy, it is even 
more important to ensure that the structure complies with the true sale principle in 
order to avoid losing these benefits in case of recharacterization. 
2.3.7 Repo documentation 
The documentation used to set up a repo structure is quite different from that used both 
in secured lending as well as with financial repos. Typically, rather than entering into 
just one repo, the trader and the bank may have multiple ongoing transactions at any 
given moment with different batches of commodities. At maturity, there is not always an 
end buyer aligned to purchase the goods. In that case, the repo might be rolled over 
into a new one. In this context, it is not practical to draft extensive sales and 
repurchase contracts every time. Instead, there is a Master Agreement which sets out 
the general terms and conditions, that is complemented by confirmations for the 
individual transactions. Such confirmations may hold on a single page and the modern 
master agreements can be as brief as five pages. In comparison, the documentation 
required in setting up a loan and a security interest is much more extensive 
(Zonneveld, 2012).  
In financial repos, their relatively longer history and a higher degree of standardization 
has enabled the development of a common documentation framework. There are now 
three major documents covering repos: the Global Master Repurchase Agreement 
(GMRA), based on the U.K. legal precedent, the Master Repurchase Agreement used 
in the U.S. and the European Master Agreement (Osterberg, 2011). In commodities, 
because of the high degree of heterogeneity among the structures and the need to 
tailor them to a unique business context, an equivalent standard document does not 
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exist. The master agreements are bespoke and negotiated between the parties, 
although financial institutions may have a base draft that is adapted for each situation. 
Further, since commodity repos involve goods rather than securities, the master 
agreements reflect the national legislation applicable to the sales transactions, such as 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 under English law (Nowinski, 2012). 
2.4 Accounting Treatment 
There is no doubt that commodity repos are useful for traders, because they allow to 
optimize the use of one’s inventory while preserving operational flexibility. However, 
they are even more appealing, because they also allow to improve the company’s 
liquidity and raise cash without generating new debt (Trade Finance, 2014b).  
2.4.1 Off-balance sheet effects 
In secured lending structures, inventory only serves as collateral and remains on the 
trader’s books. New liquidity coming in the form of cash is balanced by a corresponding 
increase in liabilities. With repos, however, no new balance sheet liabilities are created 
and there is only a shift of funds on the asset side from the inventory to cash account. 
These effects on the current assets and liabilities on the balance sheet are illustrated 
below: 
Figure 4 – Effect of repos and secured loans on the trader’s balance sheet 
 
There were cases when repos were abused to give the appearance of a healthier 
financial position than it was the case, in particular at the end of the quarterly and 
annual reporting periods.  
 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
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Lehman Brothers 
The bank abused an exception granted by paragraph 218 of the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 140 which deals with the reporting of repo financing in 
the United States. When securities are sold with a standard haircut of 1-2%, repos are 
treated as secured loans. Instead, Lehman sold fixed-income and equity securities with 
larger haircuts of respectively 5% and 8%. This had the result that the bank would be 
giving up effective control over the securities which would then be derecognized from 
the balance sheet, as the proceeds of the sale alone were insufficient to buy them 
back. This came to be known as Lehman’s “Repo 105s” (from the 5% haircut) and by 
May 2008, the bank had moved $50 billion of debt off its balance sheet in this way, 
reducing its net leverage from 13.9 to 12.1, which is a substantial difference that would 
have raised analyst concerns (Smith, 2011, Wynne, p.165-166). 
Enron 
Under pressure to deliver ever growing profits every quarter, Enron had used so-called 
commodity “prepays” that allowed it to raise debt, but “transformed” the cash flows from 
financing into cash flows from operations. Although these instruments actually involved 
special purpose vehicles, they gave bad publicity to commodity repos because sales of 
inventories were involved in both cases (Wynne, p.166). In 2000, Enron had $10 billion 
in debt on its balance sheet and $4 billion in unrecognized prepays that would have 
increased its indebtedness by 40% if accounted for properly (Smith, 2011). 
2.4.2 Qualifying for off-balance sheet treatment 
We will now review the requirements for derecognition of assets under IFRS and US 
GAAP. 
2.4.2.1 IFRS 
The off-balance sheet treatment of a repo is based on the IASB Framework definitions 
of assets and their recognition. An asset is defined under §49 (a) as: “a resource 
controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic 
benefits are expected to flow to the entity” (emphasis added).  
An asset should be recognized, according to §89, when: “it is probable that the future 
economic benefits will flow to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can 
be measured reliably” (kuap.ru, 2009). 
The highlighted terms define the cumulative conditions that must be met in order to 
derecognize the goods from the seller’s balance sheet (Bollebakker, 2015): 
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1. Future economic benefits 
 The purchaser will derive economic benefit from the goods when the 
repurchase option is exercised and the goods are resold for cash; or 
 Alternatively, the purchaser may have to sell the goods in the open market or 
on a commodities exchange. 
 The prices must be fixed based on fair values and not on a “cost plus” basis. 
 
2. Control 
 The purchaser is exposed to the price risk from fluctuations in commodity’s 
value and to the counterparty risk of failure by the client to repurchase the 
goods. 
 The purchaser has the right to sell or pledge the inventory it acquired. 
 The purchaser assumes the risks of loss or damage to the goods and possibly 
insures them. 
 The purchaser is responsible for the storage costs. 
 The seller no longer has access to the goods and cannot transport them. 
 
3. Value measurement 
 The value of the goods must be ascertainable reliably. This is normally the 
case, as there is a purchase price available at which the commodity was 
bought. 
Under IFRS, an obligation to buy back the goods, rather than an option, disqualifies the 
repo from derecognition. 
2.4.2.2 US GAAP 
In a similar fashion to the IFRS rules, the bank must assume the risk of price 
fluctuations during its period of ownership and the sale and repurchase must take place 
at market prices. The seller cannot be involved in any price risk mitigation and hedging 
actions undertaken by the bank. As an additional requirement, the duration of the repo 
must be “long enough” so that the bank’s price risk is real and material. It would not be 
allowed, for example, to structure a series of weekly repos so that the bank only 
advances amounts corresponding to the goods’ current value. On the other hand, in 
contrast to IFRS, an obligation to buy the inventory back instead of having an option to 
do so is not an obstacle to derecognition under US GAAP (Bollebakker, 2015). 
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Under US GAAP, it is more difficult to achieve off-balance sheet treatment when 
structuring the transaction with special purpose vehicles. One of the major reasons is 
because an SPV would have to be consolidated with the trader when it is created 
solely for the purpose of holding inventory acquired from the former and such inventory 
comprises the majority of the vehicle’s assets. 
We have seen that from a legal standpoint, certain minor elements of the repo structure 
may not be in compliance with the true sale principle provided that they are mitigated 
when other, more important elements are compliant. On the other hand, in order to 
achieve derecognition of inventory, the accounting requirements have to be complied 
with strictly. According to Mr. Y (Appendix 7), traders are interested in using repos even 
when they cannot achieve derecognition of inventory, because the financing can be 
cheaper as the banks pass on the savings they make by having to set less capital 
aside. 
2.5 Regulatory Issues 
2.5.1 Capital relief 
Under Basel II and III, banks are required to set aside less capital for repos than for 
loans (Dunetz, 2012a). This is a consequence of having a more direct recourse in the 
case of default (no need to enforce the security interest). According to Mr. de Laat 
(Appendix 5), this is really a key advantage of repos. In particular, cash-and-carry 
structures (explained in 2.7.1) provide significant capital relief, because the bank owns 
the goods and has no obligation to sell them back to the client.  The calculation of the 
amounts is very complicated, because it is now based on models rather than defined 
percentages. With the same interest rates charged to the client, the bank’s return on 
capital can be twice as high as in secured lending. 
2.5.2 Regulated activities 
Owning commodities may result in the bank being subject to local regulations that 
apply to these goods. They may involve rules that govern the purchase and sale, 
license requirements to own commodities such as crude oil or reporting obligations 
such as REACH in the European Union for chemicals (Wynne and Koshy, 2015). 
2.6 Tax Aspects 
As owner of the goods, the bank can become liable for taxes such as the tax on profits, 
withholding tax, stamp duties or VAT (Wynne and Koshy, 2015). Conducting repo 
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financing requires understanding of these tax consequences. For example, VAT 
systems can be greatly complex or reimbursements can be as slow and unreliable as 
to become a major obstacle to the deal. This is notably an issue for repo financing in 
the Russian Federation (Belozertsev, Rutten and Hollinger, 2011).  
2.7 Repo Structure Examples 
Commodity repos take very diverse forms as they are not governed by a standardized 
contract and their exact structure varies widely depending on: 
 The bank’s policy and selection of markets/locations to do repos, 
 The client’s needs and 
 The laws and regulations that apply 
Below, we provide some examples that illustrate this diversity. 
2.7.1 Rabobank 
In his interview, Mr. Jan de Laat talked about three types of repo structures used by 
Rabobank: 
1. Buyback agreements 
This is a classical repo structure with the prices of the sale and repurchase being fixed 
from the start, so the bank does not have to hedge the price risk, but is exposed to it if 
the trader defaults on his obligation to buy back the goods. 
2. Floating prices 
The client sells inventory to the bank and buys it back at a floating price based on a 
benchmark. The bank thus has a price risk and puts in place the necessary hedges, in 
line with its role of the owner. 
3. Cash-and-Carry 
The bank buys goods from the client, but there is no repurchase obligation. It hedges 
the price risk for the planned duration of the transaction. At maturity, the bank offers the 
goods to the client who can buy them back or decide not to do so. If he refuses the 
goods, the bank delivers them onto an exchange. It follows that this specific product is 
best-suited for exchange-traded commodities with deliverable contracts and goods 
stored in regulated warehouses that are part of the exchange system. These are the 
so-called “terminal markets” and include non-ferrous metals traded on the LME or 
cocoa on the Intercontinental Exchange with qualified warehouses around the world 
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(Theice.com, 2016). The transactions typically have to be longer than three months in 
order to justify the administrative work and their actual duration depends on the market 
conditions – how profitable is the storage play based on the contango. The bank also 
makes sure that there is sufficient liquidity available in order to be able to hedge 
effectively. 
2.7.2 Poland, 2014, crude oil 
PKN Orlen, one of Central Europe’s largest oil refiners, monetized the inventory that it 
had to maintain under Poland’s minimum strategic reserve requirements that weighed 
heavily on its liquidity. The regulations allowed it to contractually assign ownership and 
maintenance of reserves to third parties. The oil was sold for 19 months, with an option 
to repurchase at any time to allow access when necessary. The deal involved 7.4 
million barrels of oil valued at $736 million and featured complete hedging of price risk 
and interest rates (Tfreview.com, 2015b).  
2.7.3 Australia, 2009, grain 
ANZ led a syndicate that set up a five-year syndicated inventory finance repurchase 
facility for AUD 475 mio of grain. The grain was sold to a trust established by the 
banks, stored in third-party warehouses and could be purchased back whenever 
required for shipments to the client’s customers (Tfreview.com, 2011).  
2.7.4 Brazil, 2004, frozen concentrated orange juice 
ABN Amro entered into a $55 million two-year revolving forward purchase agreement 
with Citrosuco, a Brazilian orange juice exporter. The bank bought the goods with 90-
day repurchase options at prices that were fixed based on a bespoke formula that the 
bank developed with models of forward prices. The goods were removed from the 
balance sheet of Citrosuco (Trade Finance, 2004).  
We can see how the above deals reflect the various characteristics of repos including 
elements compliant with the true sale, such as: 
 Derecognition of inventory and improvement of liquidity; 
 The repos have a valid purpose and serve a specific business need; 
 The options to repurchase; 
 Hedging of price risks. 
Having examined the functioning of repos, we can now move on to the events of the 
Qingdao scandal. 
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3. The Qingdao Metals Scandal 
From our interviews, we learned that fraud is neither a new nor rare phenomenon in 
trade finance. In fact, it is the biggest risk in this business and one of the most difficult 
ones to deal with if someone deliberately decides to commit it. It is not possible to 
avoid it completely. Another point is that fraud does not always happen simply because 
malevolent people set out with a specific goal to enrich themselves. Be it in commercial 
activities or finance, oftentimes it starts when companies or individuals find themselves 
in a difficult situation and at some point make the decision to start cheating. This was 
the case with Nick Leeson who single-handedly brought down the Barings Bank in 
1995 after having lost more than one billion US dollars. It had started with a tiny loss 
that he hid in an error account and that ballooned out of control as he was doubling 
down on his losing positions (Beattie, 2008). The infamous RIAS case of grain that 
disappeared from silos in Russia has also been linked to the problems that the 
company experienced after the government imposed a ban on grain exports following a 
severe drought and a failed harvest (Helmer, 2011). In a similar fashion, in Qingdao, 
there were factors that help to explain why was the fraud committed and why at that 
moment. Before turning to the scandal itself, we will examine the context in which it 
happened.  
3.1 Context: Chinese Commodity Financing Deals 
China, the world’s second-largest economy and an industrial powerhouse, has 
experienced tremendous economic growth over the last decades. Although it slowed 
down in the years following the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, it remains significantly 
higher than that of many emerging markets: 
Figure 5 – Breakdown of China’s GDP growth 
 
Source: Jha et al. (2014) 
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A large part of it is attributed to investment in fixed assets which led to a boom in the 
industrial, infrastructure and real estate sectors. As a result, China became the world’s 
leading consumer of raw materials and it currently accounts for over 40% of the global 
demand of many key commodities: 
Figure 6 – China’s share of global commodity consumption 
 
Source: Ro (2015) 
3.1.1 Origins 
In 2007, the Chinese Property Rights Law was revised. One of the changes was that 
banks could now use stocks of movable property, including raw materials, as collateral 
for loans (Frangos, 2016). Prior to the revision of the law, the main form of acceptable 
collateral was land and immovable property and private firms had great difficulties in 
accessing finance in the domestic credit market (Roache and Rousset, 2015). This 
created a new type of commodity demand in China. Goods such as metals were 
imported not only to be transformed or consumed, but also simply to be kept in bonded 
warehouses in ports, where they were not subject to import duties, as security for 
financing. This practice was initially viewed favorably by the government, as it helped to 
fuel the economic growth which was becoming more credit-driven (Curran and Steger, 
2014). 
The new financing deals truly boomed as in 2008 China unleashed a four trillion US 
dollars stimulus package in response to the financial crisis. Foreign loans, which 
included financing of commodity stocks, also increased more than threefold from $300 
billion in 2009 to $1.1 trillion in the end of 2013: 
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Figure 7 – Overseas bank loans to China 
   Source: Yap (2014) 
A key point is that the funds so obtained were not necessarily employed in activities 
that were related to the commodity supply chains. A significant part of the proceeds 
went into the shadow banking sector (Tang and Zhu, 2016) – an informal and 
unregulated lending system between companies that substituted traditional banking 
sources of funding (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao, 2015). Commodity-based lending was no 
longer financing only real trade flows – the practice came to be known as Chinese 
commodity financing deals (CCFDs) (Vulcan, 2014). Goods were imported into China 
under letters of credit and once they were in the country repos came into play to extend 
the financing beyond the term of the L/C. In a deal that serves to finance a trading flow, 
a trading company would enter into a repo transaction whose maturity would be set at 
a date when a sale to a customer was planned. Instead, repos were rolled over 
continuously and there was no business rationale for these transactions other than 
obtaining finance.  
3.1.2 Commodities involved 
As fungible, non-differentiated goods, commodities are well-suited for use in financing. 
In addition, the following characteristics are required (Yuan et al., 2014, p.11): 
 Established liquid markets – this makes the commodity easier for the financier 
to sell in case of the borrower’s default and allows to determine with certainty 
and monitor the value of the collateral. 
 High value-to-density ratio – the commodity is relatively cheaper to store; this is 
particularly the case of metals. 
 
 
Implications of the Qingdao Metals Scandal for Commodity Repurchase Agreements 
Dmitry MINKO  
 26 
 Goods must be non-perishable – so that they preserve value over time, 
especially when tied in financing schemes for a longer period than what their 
normal transformation cycle would warrant. 
 Established large seaborne markets towards China – existing infrastructure and 
logistical facilities (port terminals, warehouses) can be used to accommodate 
the additional import flows rather than having to prepare them for a new market. 
In practice, the following commodities have been used (Yuan et al., 2014, p.13): 
 Copper 







 Aromatics (gasoline blending components) (South China Morning Post, 2014a)  
 Palm oil 
 Semiconductors (Doi, 2014)  
Semiconductors are a curious outlier in the above list, reflecting the borrowers’ 
eagerness to obtain finance and that of the lenders to do business at that time: 
"Anything can be used if it has a high price and it's a product with real demand that 
banks will readily issue letters of credit for" (Doi, 2014). Analysts at investment banks 
have linked the growth in Chinese imports of commodities such as copper, iron ore and 
soybeans to increases in the stocks of these materials in bonded warehouses, as well 
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Figure 8 – China’s imports and stocks of iron ore, soybeans and copper 
 
Source: Yuan et al. (2014)  
Figure 9 – China’s copper stocks and foreign exchange loans 
 
Source: Lewis, Hsueh and Fu (2014) 
In the beginning of 2014, there was four times more copper stored in bonded 
warehouses (700'000-800'000 metric tons) than within the Shanghai Futures Exchange 
system. 
3.1.3 Profit drivers 
The profitability of the CCFD deals is driven by the following factors: 
 The interest rate differential between the currency of funding, USD, and the 





Implications of the Qingdao Metals Scandal for Commodity Repurchase Agreements 
Dmitry MINKO  
 28 
 
Figure 10 – China and US benchmark interest rates 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com (2016) 
We can see that interest rates were brought close to zero (0.25%) in the United States 
in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and stayed at that level for almost seven 
years until the first interest rate hike at the end of 2015. In China, the rates were 
lowered during the crisis as well, but much less. With an economic rebound driven by 
credit growth, rates actually had to be raised again as soon as in 2011 and stayed at 
6% until the end of 2014. With CCFDs, the difference between the cost of funding and 
the actual returns earned on the shadow banking products or loans systematically 
attained 10 percentage points per annum (Wong, Yam and Burton, 2014). 
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 Currency exchange rate between the US dollar and the yuan: 
Figure 11 – USD/CNY exchange rate 
 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com (2016) 
The above figure shows how much yuan is one US dollar worth. Over the last ten 
years, up until the beginning of 2014 there was a pretty much one-way trend of yuan 
appreciation against the dollar. This added to the profitability of the financing deals, as 
ever less yuan were needed to reimburse the loans denominated in US dollars. One 
would normally hedge the currency risk exposure on loans or investments, but the 
trend’s consistency over the years encouraged market participants to retain the FX risk 
which was in their favor. When the trend finally reversed in 2014, exchange rate gains 
turned into losses. One article states that “Chinese policy makers have engineered a 
decline in the renminbi, or yuan, currency (…) in a bid to reduce hot-money inflows” 
(Curran and Steger, 2014) which originated from CCFDs as well. 
Goldman Sachs provides an overall view of CCFD profitability with the example of 
copper that takes into account the effects of currency hedging for those who did hedge, 
as well as factors such as storage costs (which were negligible) and the roll yield from 
rolling over the hedges on the LME. One is long the physical commodity and goes 
short the futures in order to hedge the price risk. The roll yield is positive when the 
market is in contango, as one buys back the front contract before it goes into expiry 
and sells the next contract that is trading at a higher price. It is negative in 
backwardation, as the front contract trades above the next one: 
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Figure 12 – Profitability of Chinese commodity financing deals 
 
Source: Yuan et al. (2014)  
3.1.4 Effects on the markets and economy 
Just how important was the CCFD phenomenon? According to Goldman Sachs, “in 
2013, ‘hot money’ accounted for c. 42% of the growth in China’s monetary base of 
which we estimate that CCFDs contributed $81-160 billion or c. 31% of China’s total FX 
short-term loans. Given this, it is crucial for the government to manage the immediate 
impact of ‘hot money’ flow changes on the economy and markets.“ (Yuan et al., 2014). 
Recently, the topic started to be covered in academic literature. Previously, 
researchers were primarily concerned with the impact of financial actors on price 
dynamics in commodity markets through derivative instruments. New literature now 
studies the impacts on the physical markets when physical stocks are tied up as 
collateral for financing. One paper attempts to quantify the impact of the onshore-
offshore interest rate differential on the carry trade: “For every 1 basis point increase in 
the onshore-offshore interest rate differential, copper carry trade positions increase by 
$1.5 million” (Zhang and Balding, 2015). 
Another studies the effect on prices: “a one-standard-deviation increase in collateral 
demand increases metal prices by about 3% in China and by about 4% in developed 
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markets. The same change in collateral demand increases nonmetal commodity prices 
by about 1.3% in China and 2.9% in developed markets.” (Tang and Zhu, 2016). 
And another: “a 1 percentage point (ppt) surprise increase in China’s bank lending 
results in statistically significant price increases of 10-12 percent for some base metals, 
including copper. This contrasts with a 1 ppt shock to China’s industrial production 
which leads to a statistically significant change of 7-9 percent [in prices] of aluminum, 
copper, and crude oil. We suggest that one reason for the large influence of China’s 
credit aggregates may be the important role that some commodities play as collateral 
for lending in a financial system still bedeviled by information asymmetries, particularly 
for private sector borrowers” (Roache and Rousset, 2015). 
3.2 The Scandal 
It is interesting that the fraud in Qingdao, the world’s 7th busiest port (World Port 
Source, 2016) and China’s largest iron ore port (Hornby and Rice, 2014), was not 
discovered because a bank or a trader realized that there was a problem with metal in 
the bonded warehouses. Instead, in started with a government corruption probe in 
Xining, a city 1’000 miles away. The city’s Party secretary, Mao Xiaobing, was 
investigated for “serious discipline violations”, a term used to denote corruption. In the 
course of the investigation, authorities also investigated people associated with the 
party official, among which Chen Jihong, an aluminium and alumina trader and 
chairman of Dezheng Resources (Yam, Wong and Burton, 2014). The company 
presented itself as “China’s lowest-cost aluminium producer, with smelters sited 
alongside power plants and open pit coal mines in Inner Mongolia and elsewhere” 
(Hornby and Rice, 2014). Besides non-ferrous metals, it was also active in real estate 
and set up two companies in 2006 as China's housing market was booming: Qingdao 
Jinxiu Qiancheng Investment Co. and Qingdao Jiaxin Real Estate Co (Yap, 2014). 
Dezheng engaged in CCFDs to raise finance and in line with the theory discussed 
above, the proceeds went into real estate instead of being employed in the industrial or 
trading activities of the firm (Hongyuran, 2014).  
Suspicions arose that the company engaged into duplicating warehouse receipts to 
obtain multiple rounds of financing against the same batches of metal (Yam, Wong and 
Burton, 2014). A separate probe was launched and banks began to worry when Mr. 
Chen was detained in late April 2014 (Hongyuran, 2014). On May 28, authorities 
ordered to seal off the Dagang bonded storage area in the port of Qingdao (Home, 
2014a) and a part of the port in Penglai on June 8 (Bailii.org, 2015b, §34). The 
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warehouses have remained closed down ever since. Two years later, investigations 
are still ongoing and there are no indications that the facilities have been reopened. 
We have mentioned before that fraud, rather than an end in itself, may be a 
consequence of adverse changes in the company’s environment. While the exact 
details and the circumstances of Dezheng’s fraud are unknown, there were indeed 
factors that could have led the company to committing it. In July 2013, the Chinese 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology ordered 1’400 companies in 19 
industries to reduce excess production capacity and close outdated facilities. The major 
energy-consuming and highly-polluting industries such as steel, electrolytic aluminum, 
cement, as well as copper and lead smelting were the priority targets. The deadline to 
comply was short – end of 2013. Many of these companies were already in a difficult 
financial position and faced with a decrease in production, their capacity to pay off the 
official banking sector loans was threatened. Under such circumstances, it would not 
be surprising if some of these companies turned to alternative financing schemes, 
including those involving commodities (Lelyveld, 2014). And if the company had 
already maxed out the potential of such deals, it could turn to fraud. 
3.2.1 Extent of the scandal 
3.2.1.1 Volumes and value 
The scandal involved about 400’000 tons of base metals: 300,000 tons of alumina, 
70,000 to 80,000 tons of aluminium ingots and 20,000 tons of copper (South China 
Morning Post, 2014b). At that time, these quantities were worth about 380 million US 
dollars. There are big differences in the prices of these metals: alumina was only worth 
about $330 per ton (Yam, 2014a), while aluminium was trading at $1850 per ton and 
copper at $7000 per ton (Appendix 2). This means that the actual value could be 
greater if it turned out that the proportions of the more valuable copper and aluminium 
were larger than 5% and 20% respectively. As long as the warehouses remain closed, 
it is impossible to know how much metal there was in the first place. 
3.2.1.2 Exposure 
Knowing that multiple warehouse receipts were issued for each batch of metal, the 
actual exposures and potential losses are much higher. The amounts announced in the 
press gradually grew and by July 2014 reached $1 billion of exposure for international 
banks (Mason, Burton and Thomas, 2014) and $3.2 billion (20 billion yuan) for Chinese 
banks (Bloomberg.com, 2014a), for a total of $4.2 billion. If the above numbers on the 
physical volumes are correct, it means that metal was financed ten times on average. 
One article does mention that aluminium was pledged eight times over (Hotter, 2014).  
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3.2.1.3 Banks involved 
The following banks were hit by the Qingdao fraud: 
Table 2 – Banks affected by the Qingdao scandal 
Chinese banks       
Bank of China ICBC Agricultural Bank of China 
China Construction Bank Bank of Communications China Minsheng Banking Corp 
China Citic Bank China Exim Bank Industrial Bank 
China Merchants Bank China Everbright Bank Huaxia Bank 
Bank of Weifang Bank of Hebei Weihai City Commercial Bank 
Evergrowing Bank Rizhao Bank Qilu Bank 
Foreign banks     
Citigroup Standard Chartered Standard Bank 
ABN Amro BNP Paribas HSBC 
Natixis     
Source: Wang (2014)  
Among those with the largest exposures there were: 
 Citigroup - $270 million in aluminium and copper repos with Mercuria 
(Sanderson and Hume, 2014).  
 Standard Chartered Bank - $250 million exposure “across multiple clients, 
multiple locations, multiple types of facilities, not all of which will be affected" 
(Wong, Yam and Burton, 2014). The bank made $175 million in provisions for 
losses (Morris, 2014). 
 South Africa’s Standard Bank – exposure of $210 million, of which $170 million 
in aluminium repos (Kotze, 2014) in Qingdao and another $40 million in another 
port in Shandong province (probably Penglai, the second affected port). The 
bank believed that it alone was financing 80’000 metric tons of aluminium in 
Qingdao, which amounted to all aluminium kept in that port (Business Day Live, 
2014).  
 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China – “suffered a loss of less than $200 
million” (Lee, 2014).  
In comparison, ABN Amro only had an exposure of $22 million. The bank’s global 
commodities head commented that some other lenders may have “gone a bit too fast 
without proper checks and balances” (Chanjaroen, 2014).  
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3.2.1.4 Fears of contagion 
The immediate reaction was lenders hurrying to assess their exposures and trying to 
establish whether other locations were concerned. According to Deutsche Bank, 
Qingdao port only accounts for 1.8% China’s imports of refined copper and alloys, 
compared to Shanghai with 77% (Curran, Inman and Iosebashvili, 2014). However, 
there were concerns that the fraud could be more widespread in terms of locations and 
companies involved. Luckily, it turned out that it was indeed a single, isolated case with 
just one company, Dezheng Resources. In fact, there are striking differences between 
the functioning and oversight of warehouses in Shanghai and Qingdao which partly 
explain why the fraud was easier to organize there. 
First, the trade in Shanghai is largely conducted on the Shanghai Futures Exchange, 
which, like the LME, has a system of regulated copper warehouses (Eavis and Gough, 
2014). There are strict protocols for issuance of documents for stored metal. In an 
interview to Financial Times, a copper analyst for China International Futures Co said 
that he could not think of a case where copper stored in Shanghai could be pledged 
several times. In contrast, in Qingdao: “If the warehouse is not strict it might open more 
than one copy of the documents” (Hornby and Rice, 2014) – the quotation makes it 
sound as if this fundamentally fraudulent practice was an almost casual phenomenon. 
In addition, although well-known international companies are conducting warehousing 
business in China, a number of them outsource some of the activities to local firms 
because compliance with local regulations is complex. This also allowed to reduce 
costs (Burton and Wong, 2014). According to Mr. Y, in Qingdao, the option to operate 
the warehouse by oneself was not even available. Contrary to the practice in other 
ports, the port authorities insisted on operating the warehouses. This introduced a 
critical risk to the transactions as the warehousing company’s control over the 
warehouse and the goods was strongly weakened if not non-existent. For example, 
Impala, the warehousing and logistics arm of Trafigura, was leasing storage space in a 
warehouse operated by Qingdao Hongtu Logistics Co. Ltd (Bailii.org, 2015a, §20). That 
company produced stock reports based on which Impala issued warehouse receipts for 
the traders and lenders (Bailii.org, 2015a, §90(2)). This proved to be the weakest link in 
the transaction, as one report identifies Hongtu Logistics as being an affiliate of 
Dezheng Resources (RepRisk, 2015).  
In the case of Mercuria, it was alleged that Dezheng persuaded the Qingdao Dagang 
Port Company to issue fraudulent port receipts (called “rukudans”) to the warehouse 
operators Impala, CWT and GKE, which are all well-known companies, who in turn 
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issued warehouse receipts to Citi (Bailii.org, 2015b, §26). To make things worse, bank 
staff only rarely went to see the warehouses or conducted checks of inventories when 
entering into financing deals. Realizing this, traders and warehouse operators had 
more possibilities to issue multiple warehouse receipts. In fact, due to a weakness of 
regulations, this could also have happened due to mistakes or negligence without there 
necessarily being a case of fraud. Finally, there was no credit monitoring system that 
would allow the Chinese banks to verify if the same goods were financed multiple times 
(Tian, 2014). However, as pointed out by Mr. Ziegler, even if such a system existed it 
would not have helped to prevent the duplication of warehouse receipts. 
Although the metals scandal was limited to one company and two ports, it was part of a 
larger problem. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange has “uncovered almost 
$10 billion in fraudulent trade nationwide. (…) Companies “faked, forged and illegally 
re-used” documents for exports and imports” to obtain funding overseas 
(Bloomberg.com, 2014b). These “hot money flows” mentioned in the Goldman Sachs 
report were directly targeted by the investigation. The fact that the fraud in Qingdao 
was discovered in the course of a government investigation and not by lenders or 
traders is worrisome, because it means that there could be other fraudulent schemes 
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4. Qingdao Consequences 
In this chapter, we will review how the scandal has affected the use of commodity 
repos. As we will see, the response to this question involves only a limited number of 
elements that are exclusive to repos as such. A greater number of implications are 
broader and affect not only repos, but inventory and trade financing in general, be it 
with repos, secured lending or letters of credit used to import metal into China. We will 
start with the most specific topics and will then move on to the more general ones. 
First, we will examine the legal implications and issues related to ownership structures. 
Next, we will move on to how Qingdao has changed inventory finance in China. Then, 
in order to have a complete overview of the scandal’s impact, we will discuss the 
broader market effects it had in terms of prices and flows of metal. Finally, we will 
conclude the chapter with a list of specific recommendations and measures to mitigate 
risks. 
4.1 Legal Issues 
The Qingdao scandal has resulted in a great net of lawsuits involving banks, traders 
and warehousing companies. The first target would normally be the company that 
committed fraud or defaulted, but warehouse operators could also be responsible if 
they had contributed to the fraud by issuing fake documents. Lawsuits are also 
influenced by the solvency of the defendants and the prospects of recovering funds. 
For example, when the borrower is bankrupt, there is an incentive to go after the 
warehouse manager instead. On the other hand, the storage contracts may include 
liability limitation clauses, whereby the warehousing company is only liable for a certain 
maximum amount. It could be $100’000, whereas a 10’000 metric ton shipment of 
copper would be worth $68 million at 2014 prices (Burton and Wong, 2014). In turn, 
further issues may arise, such as those of jurisdiction. In litigation between Impala and 
Wanxiang Resources, the latter had a very practical incentive to have the matter 
decided by Chinese courts and challenge their contract’s jurisdiction clause by arguing 
that it was not duly incorporated in the agreement. This is because under the PRC law, 
the warehouse manager would be liable for the full amount of damages caused by the 
loss of goods, in that case $8.9 million (Bailii.org, 2015a, §31), while an English court 
would have given effect to the contract’s liability limitation clause which reduced them 
to $1 million (Bailii.org, 2015a, §52). 
A number of lawsuits were launched immediately. In many cases, there will be further 
litigation once the investigations in Qingdao are complete and the circumstances of the 
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fraud are better known. In China, civil lawsuits cannot proceed until these 
investigations are concluded, leading to great frustration among Dezheng’s creditors. In 
November 2014, a bank executive said that he expected the case to drag on for 
another two to three years (Yam, 2014b).  
4.1.1 True sale  
The legal case whose decision was perhaps the most awaited was Mercuria v Citibank. 
Among the Qingdao lawsuits, it involved the largest amount at stake, close to $270 
million. More importantly, it concerned repos on aluminium and copper (Bailii.org, 
2015b, §2) and the true sale principle was expected to be tested with commodity repos 
for the first time. 
Somewhat disappointingly, it turned out that the repos being true sales in which title 
and risk passed to Citi was common ground between the parties (Bailii.org, 2015b, §2), 
so it was not part of the issues expressly considered by the judge. Nevertheless, it was 
reassuring that the court did not challenge the true sale status either and accepted the 
parties’ position: “It would be going too far to say that this observation could be used to 
support the argument of a true sale in future cases, but the fact that neither party took 
the point and that the court did not seem troubled by that approach is to be welcomed.” 
(Usher, 2015). We can note a number of points regarding the structure and what we 
have learned about the strength of the true sale: 
 The repos were “obligated” (Bailii.org, 2015b, §2), so the repurchase was 
mandatory and not an option, which is less desirable.  
 Insurance was contracted by Mercuria with Citi being named as co-assured 
(Bailii.org, 2015b, §17) – this is in line with the recommendations in Appendix 1. 
 Substance of the transactions – while accepting that the repo legs were true 
sales, Citi simultaneously argued that the “commercial reality” of the transaction 
was: “providing finance against the security of Mercuria’s inventory of metal. 
(…) Such a lender should be able to deal with the transaction on a purely 
documentary basis and obtain repayment without having to concern itself with 
problems at the Storage Facility or otherwise deal with the warehouse 
operators.” (Bailii.org, 2015b, §63) 
The last point is an explicit admission that the bank considered the transaction to be 
secured financing in substance, the sales and repurchases only being its form. This 
does not automatically result in recharacterization under English law, because one of 
its fundamental principles is that the courts enforce the parties’ contractual intentions. A 
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transaction documented as a repo should therefore be recognized as such (principle of 
form over substance), unless there are indications that title and risks of ownership have 
not passed to the bank (Wynne, p.177). In his interview, Mr. Hold reminded that repos 
are used on a much more extensive scale with money market and fixed income 
securities and that since the true sale principle applies to them as well, a court decision 
challenging the true sale would have had an extensive impact on the financial industry. 
Having passed the legal test, commodity repos remain a fundamentally viable 
structure. Given their favorable regulatory capital treatment in many jurisdictions, they 
continue to be an attractive product for both traders and banks. 
4.1.2 Passing of title and delivery 
The question of what constitutes a valid delivery under a sales contract and more 
specifically whether the transfer of possession effectively took place was also 
examined in the Mercuria v Citibank case. The latter attempted to deliver by handing 
over blank endorsed warehouse receipts, but since they are not documents of title 
under English law, the judge ruled that delivery was not effected as the attornment from 
the warehouse operators was missing (Bailii.org, 2015b, §158 i). With the terminals 
locked down and the warehousing companies themselves not being able to access the 
premises (Bailii.org, 2015b, §34), it was not possible for them to confirm that they were 
holding metal to Mercuria’s order. 
Once again, it was not examined whether it would be possible to contract out of 
attornment (Bailii.org, 2015b, §80), so it remains uncertain if such a clause would be 
enforceable in court (Sethi, 2015). While the English law allows the parties to contract 
freely most of the time, some of the areas have been codified, for example the sales 
and purchases of goods, starting with the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (Saharay, 2010). 
One article offers potential solutions (Usher, 2015):  
 At the time of sale, ask the trader to already deliver an attornment by the 
warehouse keeper for the future resale from the bank to the client, which the 
bank then keeps in escrow until it is required to deliver the goods. The bank will 
then no longer depend on a third party to issue attornment in times of distress. 
This looks like a form of “forward attornment”. 
 In the tripartite arrangements with the warehouse operator, have the bank 
appointed as its agent, so that the bank can issue an attornment to itself, on 
notice to the warehouse.  
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Without being able to comment on the legal enforceability of such clauses, I can only 
say that I have an impression that issuing attornment in advance or, in the second 
case, when the warehouses are under lockdown is an attempt to deal with the issues 
based on documentation and to sever the link with the physical goods. It is not certain 
that the warehouse operator would agree to confirm that he will be holding the goods at 
the trader’s disposal in the future, because he cannot guarantee their existence at that 
time, for example in case the warehouse is destroyed in the meanwhile. As for the 
bank being the warehouseman’s agent, we have seen that the warehouse operators in 
Qingdao were not able to confirm to Citi that the metal was available (Bailii.org, 2015b, 
§28), so the bank would not have the basis to affirm that it was either. In any case, 
there is still a risk that such provisions could be invalidated by the court. For example, 
Citibank had attempted to argue that there was an agreement with Mercuria that 
attornment would not be required based on the wording: “without the need for any 
confirmation from the owner/operator of the Storage Facility” in the Forward Sale 
confirmations (Bailii.org, 2015b, §62). In the alternative, they had also stated that 
contrary to Mercuria, who had to effect a real delivery, Citibank could be discharged by 
a “deemed delivery” of warehouse receipts only (Bailii.org, 2015b, §66). Neither of 
these clauses which were supposed to protect the bank actually worked.  
4.1.3 Jurisdiction issues 
4.1.3.1 Incorporation of contract clauses by reference 
The Qingdao scandal served as a reminder of problems that can arise with jurisdiction. 
In the Impala v Wanxiang Resources case, the parties had an English law contract and 
the latter started proceedings in Chinese courts who ruled that the English jurisdiction 
clause did not apply (Bailii.org, 2015a, §2). The contract between the parties was 
embodied in the warehouse receipts that only had some of the clauses printed on them 
and for the rest referred to Impala’s general terms and conditions available on their 
website. Among others, that is where the jurisdiction and liability limitation clauses 
were. The English court ruled that these clauses were part of the contract, while in 
China: “Incorporation of terms by reference to them (…) is not generally possible (…) 
and the terms referred to (including arbitration clauses and limitation clauses) would 
not form part of your contract.” (Jones et al., 2015). This could be the basis for the 
Chinese court to rule that there was no consensus as to the jurisdiction clause 
(Bailii.org, 2015a, §33). 
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4.1.3.2 Enforceability of foreign court decisions 
In addition, again in Impala v Wanxiang Resources, even if the Chinese courts did 
recognize the English jurisdiction, there would have been no possibility to enforce the 
decisions made by a foreign court, as there was no reciprocal enforcement 
arrangement between the countries (Bailii.org, 2015a, §120). China has only signed 
very few such treaties, notably with Hong Kong and current or former communist 
countries such as Bulgaria or Vietnam (Uk.practicallaw.com, 2016). However, Hong 
Kong arbitration awards are enforceable in China, so that is a venue available to the 
parties to attempt to settle disputes (Seow and Pong, 2006).  
4.1.3.3 Delivery 
Because, as we have seen, the status of the warehouse receipts as documents of title 
varies across the legal systems, the same actions by Citibank (handing over of blank 
endorsed warehouse receipts) could constitute a valid delivery under the PRC laws, 
but not under the English law. This could lead to unexpected outcomes if a business 
dispute is examined before a court different than that of the jurisdiction on which the 
parties had agreed. 
4.1.4 Changes in contractual documentation 
There were mentions in the press of banks having made changes for their contractual 
documentation to include fraud (Sanderson and Hume, 2014). According to a 
presentation from Natixis, a bank affected by Qingdao, they changed their Master 
Repurchase Agreements in that sense (Mandell, 2015). Unfortunately, the details 
regarding the wording of the updated clauses are not publicly available. We must keep 
in mind, however, that attempts to reallocate some of the risks to the trader could be 
inconsistent with the bank’s status of the goods’ owner and could weaken the true sale 
status. 
4.2 Practical Implications for Inventory Financing 
In this section, we review the consequences of Qingdao for inventory finance according 
to the following categories: 
 Who is providing financing (how has the scandal affected banks); 
 to whom (changes for counterparties and in due diligence); 
 for what transactions (which ones qualify for financing); and 
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 under what storage conditions (what has changed with the warehouses). 
4.2.1 Who is providing financing 
The scandal has led the banks to review their business models and resulted in some of 
them reducing or completely exiting metal financing in China. Among those were the 
banks that were the most hit by the scandal. Standard Chartered immediately stopped 
new financing and refinancing of existing deals (Watson, 2014). HSBC and Citic soon 
followed suit (Trade Finance, 2014a). Today, Citigroup is no longer involved in this 
business in mainland China (South China Morning Post, 2015).  
A point mentioned by five interviewees out of six is that some of the most affected 
banks were not traditional trade finance actors with decades of activity in this area. 
Banks like Citigroup were the most aggressive in going after deals, some of which 
other financiers focused on transactional financing would not have engaged in at all. In 
fact, Citigroup had only entered the Chinese commodity repo market in 2011 
(Berthelsen and Kent, 2014). In 2014, their financing book was $400 million, meaning 
that the Mercuria repos were a highly concentrated position that comprised two-thirds 
of their portfolio (Tan, 2014).  
Overall, trade finance in the region declined by 1.4% in 2014 compared with an 
increase of 43.8% the year before (Bermingham, 2015a). Many other factors coming 
into play, it is difficult to state what part of the decrease is attributable to Qingdao. The 
gap left by some of the big players was filled by other banks, such as ANZ, DBS and 
the Bank of China (Bermingham, 2015b). There were also new entrants – trade finance 
funds: “I’m seeing tiny funds opening on an almost daily basis – most of which I’ve 
never heard of. They’ve got the money to lend and they see the commodity trade 
market here as a relatively easy one to enter” said Philip Gilligan, finance and 
insolvency partner at Deacons, in an interview to the Global Trade Review 
(Bermingham, 2015a). These funds were not a new phenomenon (Mr. Zreikat, 
Appendix 9), but Qingdao increased the demand for their services, as the big banks 
made client acceptance stricter (Mr. de Laat, Mr. Y) and focused on top-tier clients. 
They had an additional advantage in that they offered highly tailored services, while the 
big banks could no longer dedicate as much attention to small and medium clients 
because of increasing regulatory costs (Bermingham, 2015b).  
4.2.2 Counterparties & due diligence  
Due diligence has become much more extensive. In addition to knowing one’s 
customer’s business, it also became necessary to know his suppliers, his clients and 
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his clients’ clients in order to have more visibility over the supply chain. For example, it 
should raise concerns if an exporter’s and importer’s businesses are not related. In 
addition to authenticating warehouse receipts, it is a necessity to go and visit the 
warehouses (Lee, 2015). These were some of the points stressed by the majority of 
our interviewees. 
Furthermore, Chinese banks have taken the initiative to build an informal information 
sharing system to keep track of what banks have lent against which warehouse 
receipts (Tradefinanceanalytics.com, 2015). It does not help, however, when there are 
duplicate receipts that appear to be authentic on their face – hence the need to actually 
visit the premises. For example, the Mercuria v Citibank case mentions that the 
warehouses only contained 60’000 to 70’000 tons of aluminium, while that bank alone 
was supposed to have 73’000 tons (Bailii.org, 2015b, §29). These kind of mismatches 
are easy to notice and conducting such checks at the very least reduces the possible 
number of duplicate receipts. 
SWIFT launched a regional initiative in Asia to create a compliance repository where 
banks can submit and share know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering 
(AML) information (Tradefinanceanalytics.com, 2014c). This would particularly help 
smaller banks who do not benefit from economies of scale and for which the due 
diligence costs reduce the attractiveness of trade finance. 
4.2.3 Transaction conditions 
Transaction volumes have decreased because some banks reduced or stopped 
financing as a matter of policy, but also because the associated conditions became 
more stringent: 
 Banks increased margins – while they used to be 10% on a letter of credit (L/C), 
they were raised to 30% when a company had a credit facility in place and no 
financing was provided without a facility (Tradefinanceanalytics.com, 2014a).  
 The costs of financing rose (Sanderson and Hume, 2014). However, this was a 
very much local phenomenon that only concerned China as the risks in these 
transactions were now better accounted for. Mr. Y and Mr. Zreikat have not 
witnessed such effects in their business. 
 China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange has ordered the banks to 
tighten lending conditions and not to process import L/Cs unless the traders 
could present the end-buyers in the country. 
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 This is why, processing times for L/Cs increased from two to three days to two 
to three weeks, as in addition to due diligence on their counterparties, the banks 
also had to ascertain whether there was a real trading flow. 
 In particular, banks became reluctant to open L/Cs unless the cargo was still on 
the ship and turned away from metal that was already in warehouses (Trade 
Finance, 2014a).  
4.2.4 Changes in warehousing 
4.2.4.1 Operating models 
Having fallen victim to a lack of control over the metal they were storing, the warehouse 
companies adapted their way of functioning.  
At first, Impala did not exit the business in China and it qualified the impact of Qingdao 
as “not material”. Instead, it ceased operations in other South-Eastern Asian locations: 
Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand, as well as in Turkey and Italy 
by the end of 2014. However, it stopped working with third-party operators and focused 
on the sites that it leased or owned, with own staff in place (Onstad, 2014). A year 
later, it did end up exiting its metal warehousing joint venture in China, without 
commenting on whether the scandal had played a role (Desai and Onstad, 2015).  
We have previously mentioned Steinweg, a veteran firm who has benefited from the 
scandal. They are said to have had inflows of more than 100’000 tons of copper – 
about one-fifth of all the copper estimated to have been held in bonded warehouses in 
Shanghai and as much as in the LME system worldwide (Burns, 2014).  
4.2.4.2 Collateral management agreements 
Qingdao has highlighted the importance of inventory being managed by an 
independent third party under a collateral management agreement, or CMA. These are 
tripartite agreements between the lender, the borrower and the collateral manager 
(Wynne, p.122) who can either be the warehouse operator himself or another company 
that would lease a part of the warehouse and take over the responsibility for the stocks. 
The collateral manager is responsible for activities such as (Drum Commodities 
Limited, 2016): 
 “Monitoring of goods to and from a port 
 Warehouse/tank farm receipts that enable product to be pledged to a bank or a 
lender 
 Stock reporting 
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 Release mechanisms for the bank when the borrower makes payments 
 Marine and Cargo Services 
 Further risk mitigation services” 
Mr. Hold and Mr. Zreikat mentioned that the service is becoming scarcer as it was 
affected by several prominent cases of fraud, with major players such as SGS and 
Intertek having stopped providing it (Floret, 2015) because of the high risks and 
relatively low fees involved. An event as publicized as Qingdao could convince the 
lenders that the additional costs for the safety it offers are well worth paying. An 
example of a company who took this business seriously is Drum Risk Management. 
Wary of the relations that could develop between people and pressures on collateral 
managers, they go as far as to move and rotate employees between locations and 
countries every two months or even every couple of weeks in high-pressure 
environments. The company guarantees that it does not trust anyone 
(Tradefinanceanalytics.com, 2014b).  
4.2.4.3 LME 
Less than one month after the scandal broke out, an LME spokeswoman said that the 
exchange was keen on entering that market. There was indeed demand for the security 
offered by its regulated warehouses, the most credible storage solution available for 
metals (Burton and Wong, 2014). The exchange has licensed warehouses in all the 
major locations in South-East Asia, except for China: Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan – most of the countries that Impala exited. 
Figure 13 – LME warehouses in Southeastern Asia 
 
Source: Lme.com (2016b) 
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A year later, their view changed: LME still had not entered China because of regulatory 
obstacles, but also reputational risks: “The LME does not want to open a warehouse 
where it might have any chance of being subject to a similar fraud in Qingdao. (…) That 
would be a disaster for the LME’s reputation internationally and undermine its 
infrastructure.” (Tradefinanceanalytics.com, 2015). 
4.2.4.4 Electronic warehouse receipts 
The LME considered however expanding its electronic LMEsword system, which 
serves to prove the origin and title to metal, to warehouses outside its network as well 
(Cohen, 2015). They started testing a new system called LME Shield in December 
2015. As LME warehouses tend to be located in the major consuming countries (which 
tend to developed countries with less political risk), the potential for its use was 
significant, for example in producing countries such as Chile (Onstad, 2015). LME 
Shield was rolled out in March 2016 in a warehouse of China Materials Storage and 
Transportation Development. Its ultimate test will be whether the banks will accept the 
electronic receipts as valid collateral for financing (Hume and Sanderson, 2016). 
Kynetix, the financial technology firm who helped to build LMEsword, is exploring the 
potential for application of the cryptographic security tools that are used in the 
blockchains of digital currencies such as Bitcoin (Burton, 2015).  
4.3 Effects on Metal Markets 
4.3.1 Prices 
Although copper had the least quantities involved in the scandal, its prices were the 
most affected, because it was the second most popular metal used in Chinese 
commodity financing deals by value, after precious metals and before iron ore: 
Figure 14 – Commodities used in CCFDs 
 
Source: Yuan et al. (2014)  
Copper prices dropped by 4.5% and the cash-to-three-months backwardation on the 
LME decreased from $101 per ton at the end of May to $3 backwardation on June 6 
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(Home, 2014b), reflecting less eagerness to take delivery of metal. However, prices 
immediately started to recover and by July were already higher than just before the 
scandal. Appendix 2 shows the price action in 2014 in copper and aluminium, but also 
in nickel and zinc, metals that were not involved in Qingdao, but were also used in 
CCFDs and experienced an interesting effect in imports. We can see that in beginning 
of June, when the fraud was discovered, only the prices of nickel decreased like those 
of copper, while those of zinc remained stable and aluminium prices even increased. 
One reason is that contrary to copper, aluminium’s use in CCFDs was marginal, as 
shown in the table above. 
4.3.2 Imports 
In reaction to the scandal, metal was moved to safer locations, typically from bonded 
warehouses in China to LME warehouses in Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. In 
addition, less metal was needed for the financing deals whose flows have slowed 
(Reisman, 2015). As a result, while the Chinese refined copper demand grew by 14.1% 
in 2014, year-on-year copper import growth went from close to 90% as of May 2014 to 
a 15% decrease by August: 
Figure 15 – Year-on-year changes in Chinese copper imports 
 
 
Source: Mukherji (2015)  
Overall, there were 10% less imports in the second half of 2014 than during the first six 
months (Store.eiu.com, 2015). Bonded warehouse stocks decreased by 25% from 
750’000 to 575’000 metric tons between June and September, but started to grow 
again in March 2015: 
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Figure 16 – Chinese copper stocks in bonded warehouses 
 
Source: Bloomberg.com (2015) 
In fact, the metals most impacted in terms of trade flows were nickel and zinc: China 
became a net exporter of nickel for the first time, with 73’000 tons exported between 
June and October, which contributed to dampening the price rally caused by a ban on 
exports in Indonesia. There was the same effect with zinc: China became a net 
exporter for the first time since 2008, with 86’000 tons exported between June and 
October compared to just 1’012 tons during the period between January and May 
(Home, 2014a): 
Figure 17 – Chinese nickel and zinc exports 
 
Source: (Orsal, 2015) 
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Although these trade flow reversals are interesting, the quantities involved are only a 
tiny fraction of China’s demand of these metals. The 86’000 exported tons of zinc only 
account for about 1.3% of the demand and zinc exports for about 0.7% (Insg.org, 
2016): 
Figure 18 – Chinese metal demand 
 
Source: (Sanderson, 2016) 
Finally, we note that it is very difficult to comment on the impact of Qingdao beyond the 
first several weeks and months following the event. Market prices are thought to 
incorporate all information available at a given moment. This is why, while we can 
attribute the immediate effects to the scandal, as time goes, other factors take over in 
defining the current prices, such as the Chinese economy growth, the US monetary 
policy, mine closures and so on. The same applies to imports – the situation is ever-
changing and the trade flows fluctuate based on the relative changes in China’s 
demand growth on one hand and all the other demand and supply developments on 
the other. 
4.4 Recommendations 
The Qingdao scandal had two kinds of implications for repos: it was a legal test of the 
structure, as well a case of fraud. With regards to the legal points, it is important to: 
 Make sure that the structure complies with the principle of true sale and that the 
bank’s responsibilities are in line with its role of the goods’ owner. 
 Verify that the structure works well with all the legal systems involved and 
request legal opinions from lawyers. 
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As for fraud, knowing that this risk that cannot be eliminated entirely, what measures 
can be taken to reduce it as much as possible? We can formulate some practical 
recommendations based on what Qingdao has taught or reminded us: 
Deal approach 
 Only finance real trade flows as opposed to immobilized stocks (Mr. Y); 
 Have vision over the goods' origin and be able to trace them back (Mr. X, 
Appendix 6; Mr. Ziegler); 
Setting up the storage 
 Build and maintain a database on warehouse operators and their track record 
(Mr. de Laat, Mr. X, Mr. Ziegler); 
 Use collateral management agreements and appoint a second inspector to 
monitor the collateral manager (Mr. Hold, Mr. Ziegler); 
 Make sure that the collateral manager is insured against employee fraud (Mr. 
Hold, Mr. Ziegler); 
 Visit the warehouses and be aware of your collateral’s state; 
 Better labelling is needed to identify if the metal is pledged in favor of or owned 
by a financier and if yes, who (Tfreview.com, 2015a). This measure tackles the 
problem from an opposite direction than the electronic warehouse receipts do, 
as it addresses the goods themselves rather than the documents representing 
them.  
It would have been good to have a safe and credible warehouse system in China 
similar to that of the LME, but the environment in the country is such that the exchange 
does not want to enter it at the moment. Since not much can be realistically expected 
to change quickly, the best solution is to remain vigilant and apply the above principles. 
One law firm has summarized the whole issue in just several lines:  
“Despite the particular Chinese backdrop, it is clear that the Qingdao 
experience serves as a further reminder that notwithstanding the strength 
of the legal documentation, it remains the case that there is no alternative 
than to undertake proper due diligence on the counterparties, local legal 
system and underlying trade transaction and that this needs to be 
supported by trustworthy monitoring and access to the inventory during the 
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5. Conclusion 
Fraud is a risk that one should be prepared to face in trade finance. There have been 
other cases involving duplicate warehouse receipts before Qingdao (a collapse of a 
steel trader in Eastern China in 2013 (Hornby and Rice, 2014)), at the time of the 
scandal (mixed aromatics in Tianjin in July 2014 (Taipeitimes.com, 2014)) and there 
will be others, in China and elsewhere.  
Commodity repos have passed a first test in the Mercuria v Citibank case, although we 
yet have to wait to see the questions of true sale and contracting out of attornment 
addressed directly. We have also seen how the scandal has affected trade finance in 
China and what changed in the way the deals are set up. There is more due diligence 
on the counterparties and the warehouses, but there are also lenders whose business 
in fact has not changed much, because they already had a rather conservative 
approach and would not have engaged in financing immobilized stocks in bonded 
warehouses in China. 
It is likely that the increased standards of diligence are here to stay – at least until there 
is another commodity boom which would make people lower their guard. The 
reinforced demand for safety could lead the market players to accept higher fees for 
collateral management services, in line with the liabilities that their providers assume 
(Mr. Hold). This could improve the availability of these services and would be a 
welcome development for a healthier market. 
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Appendix 1: Strength of the true sale argument 
Factor Supporting true sale Undermining true sale 
1. Purchase price The purchase price is close to the 
market price as of the date of the 
purchase. The resale price is close to 
the observable forward market prices, 
for example on futures exchanges. 
The purchase and resale prices have 
little relation to the market prices. 
2. Period of 
ownership 
The period of the financier's ownership 
is aligned to match the trader's 
genuine inventory financing needs 
between the acquisition of the 
commodity and its resale to a buyer. 
The period of the financier's ownership 
seems to have been chosen to achieve 
a more favorable accounting position 
at the relevant financial reporting dates 
(end of quarter, end of year). 
3. Insurance The bank procures insurance for the 
goods itself or is co-insured with the 
trader. 
The goods are insured solely by the 
trader, but the bank is the policy's 
beneficiary. 
4. Storage services 
provider 
The bank arranges for storage with an 
independent warehousing company 
and has a direct contract with it. 
The goods remain in a warehouse 
controlled or operated by the trader 
and their segregation is unsatisfactory. 
5. Ability to pass 
title 
The financier obtains the documents 
that allow him to pass title to another 
party at any time and give control over 
the commodity. 
The trader retains control over the 
goods and the bank cannot effect a 
sale without his involvement. 
6. Option to 
repurchase 
The trader only has an option, but not 
an obligation, to repurchase the goods 
at repo's maturity. 
The trader has an obligation to 
repurchase the goods, or has an 
"option" to do so, but it is exercised 
automatically. 
7. Different seller 
and re-purchaser 
The commodity is purchased from one 
company, but is resold to another 
entity at repo's maturity. 
At maturity, the commodity is resold to 
the same original seller. 
8. Price risk 
hedging 
The bank makes its own arrangements 
to hedge the price risk arising during its 
ownership. 
The repo documentation includes 
indemnities from the trader to 
compensate the bank for losses 
resulting from price risk. 
9. License to own 
the commodity 
The bank has obtained the required 
licenses or authorizations to own a 
commodity prior to entering in the 
transaction. The license is general and 
not specific to the transaction. 
The transaction has been structured so 
as to avoid having to obtain relevant 
licenses or authorizations. 
10. Purpose of 
repo 
The trader uses the repo to obtain a 
specific cash flow that helps to 
optimize its business activities. 
The only apparent benefit of the repo 
is to move the inventory off the balance 
sheet. 
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Appendix 2: LME settlement prices of selected metals 
in 2014 
 
Source: LME data via theFinancials.com (2016)  
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Appendix 3: Thematic table of interviews 
 
  
Themes and Ideas Mr. Hold Mr. de Laat Mr. X Mr. Y Mr. Ziegler Mr. Zreikat
1. Fraud in trade finance
Fraud is the biggest risk in trade finance x x
Fraud is neither new nor rare x x
It is not possible to have zero fraud risk x
Fraud is more likely in difficult times x x
The riskiest activity is financing immobilized 
stocks
x x x
2. Approach to business
Traditional commodity trade finance vs. newer 
financial entrants, transactional financing vs. 
deals not linked to real trading flows
x x x x x
You cannot rely on documents alone, need to 
go in the field
x x
The bank does repos with exchange-traded 
commodities and terminal markets
x
The bank is focused on transactions under 90 
days
x
Repos are an attractive product and the bank 
would like to do more of them
x
3. Warehousing
CMAs have become more expensive and 
inspection companies are reluctant to provide 
this service
x x
It is not certain that liability limitation clauses 
always work and reputational damage is an 
issue
x
The bank is using CMAs more often x
4. Due diligence
Know your conterparty and the warehouse x x x x x
The bank already had or has made its client 
acceptance more strict
x x
More stringent KYC and due diligence was 
already a trend before Qingdao
x x x x x
The tightening of policies is here to stay x x
5. Specific measures to reduce risk
Appoint a second inspector to monitor the 
collateral manager
x x
Contract insurance against warehouse 
employee fraud
x x
Warehouse operator database and KYC x x x
Must have vision over the goods' origin, be 
able to retrace it
x x
It would be good to have a system similar to 
that of the LME
x x
Only finance real trade flows x
6. What about external solutions?
Not much can be realistically changed in the 
business environment in China in the near 
term. The solution is to be vigilant.
x x
Evolution of legislation or technology does not 
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Appendix 4: Interview with Mr. William Hold 
Mr. Hold is a Senior Associate in Holman Fenwick Willan's Geneva office. He regularly 
acts for trading companies in disputes involving a range of physical commodities and 
his practice also involves non-contentious commercial and trade finance work. 
What trends have you observed in the market in the aftermath of the Qingdao 
scandal? 
Companies who used to offer services as collateral managers are now finding this too 
risky to do. Some of them do not want to do it anymore and are getting out of this 
business, so it is becoming more difficult to obtain inventory financing when goods are 
used as collateral. There have been other cases of collateral disappearing before, last 
year there was a case in Liberia involving rice, a quantity enough to feed country for 
about 6 months. Qingdao involved large quantities of metal, made a lot of banks 
nervous and made a lot of press. The risk has always been there and the 
developments just accelerated after Qingdao because of the publicity around the case. 
There are basically two problems. The first is, if want to trade in commodities and 
cannot finance yourself, you will need to borrow funds and for that you will need 
collateral, because the bank will not lend 10-100 million US dollars unless there is 
some kind of security. Unless one has a full bank account, collateral such as a nice 
property in London or a strong guarantee from another party, the collateral will have to 
be the goods themselves. This leads to the second point: if you use goods as 
collateral, there are all sorts of issues about how to store them and that was the 
problem in Qingdao. No matter how the deal is structured, be it a normal trade finance 
deal or a repo or a sharia-compliant financing, there has always been the issue that 
someone has to store the goods in a safe place. So, I think that fundamentally not very 
much will change, because people will continue to use whatever they can as security. 
However, previously one could say: “we have the goods in a warehouse that is safe, 
someone is watching them and we trust that company, so it is fine”. That is probably 
going to change, because people will not be as trusting, so they will ask people to go 
watch over those who are holding the goods, an extra set of eyes, and that of course 
has a cost. The cost of financing is going to go up in turn and the addition to the total 
costs of the goods will be ultimately passed on to the final consumer. It is the same 
thing for the actual warehouse agents or the collateral managers as well – up until now, 
their fees were very low compared to the value of the goods that they were storing. So, 
they were exposed to huge potential risks compared to the revenues that they derived. 
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It has gotten to such a point that big players like SGS do not want to do this anymore, it 
is too dangerous. 
I think that in order for serious people to start doing the business again, the fees will 
have to go up, in line with the risks that they are taking. One of the ways in which these 
players can try to protect themselves is through contractual clauses that limit their 
liability if something happens, but these clauses do not always work and even if they 
do, this potentially involves a lot of reputational damage.  
Another issue is the approach to insurance. I have been talking to insurance brokers 
and many people, including clients, are thinking very hard about how to insure against 
the risk of fraud, are looking at their insurance contracts to see if this kind of event is 
covered and if not what can they do.  
How effectively can one insure himself against fraud? Is not there a problem, 
because there is an incentive to commit fraud if you are insured against it? 
It depends: if the bank is insured, the people on the ground may not know that that is 
the case. Then, there is a difference between when the fraud is committed by the 
management of the company or if it is just guards who were corrupted to open the 
doors one night and let in a truck to load the goods. So if a junior employee somehow 
finds out where his boss keeps the keys and steals them, it probably does not make 
much of a difference to him whether there is insurance or not. But this a very big topic 
and many people are wondering how to manage this. One senior banker told me that 
they are desperately looking for a solution, because otherwise the way they do 
business is going to change completely. 
You mentioned that the trend was to try to get more warranties or try to pass 
back risks and liabilities through contractual arrangements onto the trader – 
would not that be contradicting the true sale principle, knowing that the financier 
should assume the risks that come along with ownership of the goods? 
I was not talking about the warranties of the seller, what I meant is there are going to 
be much higher requirements towards the warehouse operators and collateral 
managers, which is entirely consistent with a normal repo structure. When I buy 
something, I want to make sure that it is indeed there before I pay for it. Everyone is 
doing a lot of due diligence, whether it is on the goods, the storage locations or the 
parties to the contract. There is another point which has to be made, that in cases like 
Qingdao or the Liberia rice case I mentioned earlier, it is highly probable (but still 
uncertain, because proceedings are ongoing in both cases) that the fraud was actually 
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a very organized one that involved a substantial number of people in important 
positions. When I say important, I do not necessarily mean directors of companies, but 
people in positions to help carry out the fraud, such as the person at the door who lets 
the truck in. Under those circumstances, there is no such thing as zero risk.  You can 
reduce the risk by having checks and balances and having separate people in separate 
locations check on each other or having people check that the other people are doing 
what they should, but if several people get together and organize to commit fraud, 
effectively there is not very much that you can do about it. 
The true sale argument is stronger if the goods are resold to another company – 
should it be another company within the client’s group structure or could it be a 
totally different counterparty in the market? 
If the end party which buys the goods is a totally different party it is almost certainly a 
true sale. If I lend you something, you will have to give it back to me. But if I sold you 
the goods, you can do whatever you want with them. If that party is related to the first 
party, it can become a little bit more complicated. It depends on the exact legal 
framework, but if there is only very loose affiliation, it would probably be a true sale. I 
think the real issue is whether the two legs of the repo are connected. If for example it 
is exactly the same bars of metal or oil in tanks which is passed back and forth, there is 
more risk that the repo will be recharacterized as a loan. So if the contract expressly 
provides that it has to be the same goods, that can be dangerous. If, however, it is just 
a coincidence that the goods are the same, it is generally not a problem. If you think of 
steel bars, if the contract says that you have to sell me back 500 tons, it does not have 
to be the same bars. In practice, the bank is not a trader and does not want to move 
the goods, it is easier to keep them where they are, so they do tend to be the same. 
Each contract is unique, but often it says: “I will sell you 500 tons of steel bars with 
specifications a, b, c, d” and you have the same specifications on the second leg. The 
real issue is to make sure that the buyer does not have a right of recourse, the repo 
has to be set up so that once the goods are sold it is final and the buyer has the legal 
right to do what they want with them, but also assumes a certain amount of risk. One of 
the issues is gauging how much risk has to pass for sale to be recognized as a true 
sale. I would add that the precise legal nature of repos is actually being debated in 
many legal systems.  
Just how important and useful was the Mercuria v Citibank case for the legal and 
banking community? It was the first time the principle of true sale was tested in 
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court with commodities, but the true sale status was common ground between 
the parties, so it was not expressly examined by the judge. 
A lot of people were concerned that repos would be examined by the judge and that he 
could have come to an inconvenient conclusion. There was relief that the judge did not 
look at it in detail due to the fact that the parties had agreed on that point, so in that 
respect, repos were not really tested. My personal sense is that even if they were, the 
principle as such would have still been upheld. The reason for that is because repos 
are common in commodities, but they are used far more massively in financial 
transactions. If a bank or a company need short-term cash they can repo shares or US 
Treasuries. It is such a prevalent instrument in the financial markets, if suddenly it did 
not work anymore, a lot of people would have very big problems. They are more 
standardized than in commodities, but the basic idea, the principle of ownership 
passing is very much the same, regardless if you are using US Treasuries or crude oil. 
How exactly does the local law (lex situs) of the country where the goods are 
located come into play and at what point? 
That is a very complex question. Basically, the lex situs comes into play in two ways. 
The first one has to do with liability of the warehouse manager who is holding the 
goods. It may be that the only applicable law is the local one, then you have to see in 
that law whether the warehouse manager is liable and whether you can use a different 
law, for example English law, to enter in to a contract. The second way in which the lex 
situs was discussed was as to when title passes. In Mercuria v Citibank case, the 
question was whether title could pass through the delivery of the warehouse receipts. 
The court held that this is not enough on its own for the title to pass under English law 
and that attornment from the warehouse operator was required. However, I understand 
that it would not be needed under Chinese law, since warehouse receipts are 
considered documents of title and it is enough to transfer a warehouse receipt for the 
title to pass. There was another case with Impala Warehousing and Wanxiang 
Resources in which many of these issues were considered. 
Can you avoid the local law completely if in your contract you agree on a 
jurisdiction different than that of the country where the goods are stored? 
It depends on whether, and if so, to what extent, the local law will let you avoid it. 
Ultimately, when dealing with complex contractual structures, one has to look at what is 
permissible at the place where the goods are stored, because getting access to the 
goods is what counts the most. I think in China the situation was complicated, since the 
 
 
Implications of the Qingdao Metals Scandal for Commodity Repurchase Agreements 
Dmitry MINKO  
 70 
warehouse managers were not operating the warehouses because of regulatory 
reasons. I understand that you need to be a Chinese company in order to run that 
business in China, so they were in effect subcontracting to Chinese companies, which 
raises more issues as well.  
In Impala v Wanxiang, the latter started proceedings in Chinese courts and the other 
party said that this was not allowed under their contract and asked the English court for 
an anti-suit injunction. That is actually a very robust and strong measure that is rarely 
given out, because other party risks imprisonment when they come to England or 
Europe if they do not comply. Whether or not parties will be litigating in a Chinese court 
will depend very much on, firstly, the contract and if it provides for disputes to be heard 
by Chinese courts, that is where you will go. Second, it may happen when for example 
the situation is not clear as to when title has passed or when there are non-contractual 
claims, basically tort or civil liability.  
So you may potentially have different outcomes under the different legal 
systems? 
Potentially, yes, and it is a very unpleasant situation to be in for lawyers and for parties 
to proceedings. 
What roles do the legal opinions play in structuring the deals? 
They are part of the normal due diligence when setting up these deals, there is almost 
always a legal opinion from a local lawyer saying: “Yes, you have an English law 
contract, the local courts will recognize the contract and that the English law applies. 
Yes, this deal is acceptable under Chinese law” and one would expect them to look at 
whether the mechanics work, for example whether title would pass, under what 
conditions, and so on. They would also think about how these two different legal 
systems work together. Legal opinions are basically one of the conditions precedent to 
any contract being finalized. Nothing is signed unless the bank has a draft legal opinion 
saying that the deal works as contemplated. Once the contract is signed, the lawyer 
issues his final legal opinion and the money does not go anywhere until the final legal 
opinions are received by the bank.  
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Appendix 5: Interview with Mr. Jan de Laat 
Mr. de Laat is Regional Manager, Trade & Commodity Finance (India – Middle East – 
Africa region) and Chief Executive Officer for Rabobank, Kenya. Before moving to 
Nairobi, Mr. de Laat was based in London as Managing Director, Trade and 
Commodity Finance (Emerging Markets) for Rabobank. 
First, some questions about the functioning of commodity repos. Is the pricing 
of the transactions typically done on a fixed or floating basis?  
There are different ways of financing stocks with ownership structures. There are the 
classical repo structures whereby the bank is buying stocks from a client under a 
buyback agreement and the client buys them back at a later point in time. The prices 
are fixed and the risk of bank is that of the client not to fulfill his repurchase obligation. 
Then, there is an alternative format, which is, the client is selling inventory to the bank 
who is responsible for price hedging and the client is buying back at a floating price. 
Any gains or losses on the physical goods are thus offset by those on the paper side.  
Finally, there is a third type, a structured inventory finance product called cash and 
carry whereby we buy stocks from the client and there is no repurchase obligation. In 
that case, we pay for the full value of the goods and hedge them. At maturity, we offer 
the goods to our client who has the right of first refusal. If he does not buy back, we 
deliver them on the exchange. This only works for commodities that are deliverable, for 
example copper on the LME with approved warehouses around the world. 
Is there any kind of discount that is applied to the goods’ value so that the bank 
only advances, say, 90% of the market price, or is the financing done on 100% 
basis? 
With repo contracts it is a matter of negotiation, but the clients do expect that we 
finance 100%. If we have a commodity traded on an exchange, like the LME or 
NYMEX or CBOT, the hedge is straightforward. If it a niche commodity, such as tea or 
nuts, then we do apply a discount. The liquidity of the commodity is also a factor that 
could influence the final advance rate.  
What is the typical range of durations that are possible under repos? 
Because it is a quite labor-intensive product and we need to manage the purchases, 
sales and hedging, we require durations of at least three months, so it does not work 
as well with fast-moving goods. It can go up to a year – it also depends on the 
contango conditions in the market, so it has to be profitable for the client to put the 
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goods away for this period of time. The gain from the forward sales price has to 
outweigh the storage and financing costs. On the bank’s side, we also need to make 
sure that there is sufficient liquidity for us to hedge and that is normally the case for 
expiries of up to three to six months. 
When the Qingdao scandal broke out, what was your immediate reaction as a 
bank? 
The first reaction was panic. What we do is we immediately assess our exposure 
across the relevant branches. In that case we were not involved with repo structures, 
nor with cash-and-carry structures, but we were involved in straightforward stocks 
financing under a pledge and thankfully we were not hit by the scandal. After the initial 
investigation, we determined that we were not running a risk of loss there, which gave 
us a lot of comfort. Afterwards, we discussed internally to see how we can prevent 
such a situation in the future. We actually made client acceptance more stringent, are 
taking even more care of our stocks by using collateral management agreements and 
collateral monitoring contracts more often. It is another story for other banks, such as 
Citi. We were not involved to that extent and once again, we had not engaged in repos 
or cash and carry for Chinese stocks, because the warehouses are not part of a 
system such as the LME.  
So it depends on the bank’s risk appetite, because other banks did go ahead to 
finance stocks in bonded warehouses which involved a much greater risk? 
Rabobank is one of the conservative banks and professional players in the field. We 
have very strict policies for financing stocks and structures such as repos or cash-and-
carry. We only do it with first tier clients and it has to be with a third-party warehouse, 
not one leased or operated by the client. This is already taking away a lot of trouble. 
We insist on doing financing on a transactional basis, with 90% of our portfolio being in 
this category. In addition to conducting due diligence on our clients, we work with a list 
of pre-approved warehouses. A client can offer a new warehouse, in which case we will 
put it through our clearance process. We go there, talk to the owners and we want to 
see an established firm with a solid track record and reputation. If we have any doubts, 
we may still go ahead provided that a CMA is put in place, which makes the transaction 
more expensive. The collateral manager is then leasing the space in the warehouse 
and is fully responsible for the losses. You have to take care of the goods as a good 
house father. 
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Besides that, do you feel that you were already doing things “the right way” 
before?  
We have a team of 25 people operating worldwide who are professionals with a long 
experience in the industry and are authorized to sell the Structured Inventory Finance 
product. They are running a multi-billion portfolio whose size fluctuates based on 
market conditions and opportunities. We spend a lot of time to cover all the risks 
involved and the deals are set up in line with the very strict policies under the 
supervision of our risk managers. This indeed allowed our portfolio to remain healthy 
despite the Qingdao disease.  
When you are talking for example about stricter client acceptance, were these 
measures implemented for the long term, are they still in place now, two years 
after the scandal?  
Generally, due diligence and compliance are becoming increasingly important, so our 
requirements have definitely remained at the new levels. The banks are becoming 
stricter overall and I expect it to stay this way. We are now after the end of the 
commodities boom cycle, it is an environment of low prices and low volatility, these are 
difficult times for our clients and we do have to be more careful in such a context. We 
are trying to avoid losing money at all costs and we have to take actions with regards to 
risky clients in our books. So our income is under pressure, but we want to keep the 
quality of our portfolio as high as possible. 
Trade finance tends to have low default and low loss rates, but the margins are 
low as well, so when you do have a loss of several tens or hundreds millions of 
dollars like with Qingdao, that really hurts – a single deal wipes out the profits 
made on many others. 
You can fall into a trap if you take a short-term view, chasing after transactions and 
revenues on deals that are more likely to result in a loss. But nowadays banks are no 
longer driven by revenue, they are driven by the return they make on their capital. So if 
you experience many losses, the regulators require you to set aside more capital and 
you shoot yourself in the foot because your margins remain under pressure, but your 
return is going down. With cash-and-carry and repo structures, we get capital relief, so 
it is a very attractive option and you get a better return with the same margin.  
More attractive compared with secured lending? 
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It depends, with the repo you have the client’s obligation to buy it back, so you get less 
relief, because you still have the risk on your client. With cash-and-carry structures, 
there is a lot of relief, because there is no repurchase obligation, so that is a fantastic 
product.  
Can you provide an estimation of how much less capital do you need to put 
aside for such products? 
It is a very complicated calculation, not like in the old days when for example you did 
secured lending, so that was 8% of capital set aside for insolvency, 4% with a letter of 
credit, 0% for a standby letter of credit and so on. Those days are over, you now have 
a special model that has to be approved by the regulator in which you enter all the 
parameters, say, you are buying inventory stored in an LME warehouse and it gives 
you the number. It is very difficult to say, but in general, the relief could be for up to 
90% of what you normally have. If you look at the returns that you make financing 
inventory in OECD countries, they are generally twice as high as those in secured 
lending. It makes a huge difference. 
From what I see, there is not much that changed with regards to the functioning 
of repos after Qingdao and the instrument’s viability was not compromised. It 
seems to be a question of what kind of deals are the lenders willing to engage in 
and how much risk they are willing to take.  
The whole scam has not changed our views, we have not decided to exit this business. 
It was a confirmation that we had looked at our business in a proper way and had a 
sound policy framework. Structured Inventory Products that include repos and cash-
and-carry are important for us and we would like to grow further with these products. At 
the moment, the markets are not giving us an opportunity, because you need a steeper 
contango and clients to be willing to do these deals. There are also places where the 
local legislation does not allow you to set these structures up, like in Brazil. This 
product does not work well in Africa neither because of a lack of acceptable 
warehouses and the gaps in the regulatory and legal systems. It is only applicable to a 
handful of locations in the world, mainly in OECD countries with prime clients, so the 
potential scope for expansion is small. We would like to have more of our financing 
through ownership structures, because you do not have the risk of someone else 
having claims on the inventory or having more rights to it. To emphasize how useful 
this product is if you do it the right way: we would have all of our stock in such 
structures if it was possible.  
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Appendix 6: Interview with Mr. X 
Mr. X is a relationship manager in commodity trade finance. He requested to stay 
anonymous. The views shared below on repo and transactional financing are his own. 
Transactional financing as opposed to repo financing of inventory allows to have 
visibility over the goods from their sourcing and origin to their intended use (end-buyer 
or destination). He stressed the risks of transactions that do not correspond with the 
above situation. The problem with repos is that there is a higher risk of fraud when the 
goods spend months or even years in a bonded warehouse without moving and the 
same warehouse certificate circulates between the bank and the trader. In a normal 
transaction, fraud would likely be discovered more quickly as the goods enter or leave 
the warehouse on their way to the next step in the supply chain. Inspections would then 
be conducted and new documents issued along the way, so that any other companies 
with duplicate warehouse receipts would be more likely to identify a mismatch in quality 
or quantity or realize that goods are missing. 
A way to reduce the risk of situations such as Qingdao is to increase the due diligence 
on warehouses. Banks have due diligence process for approving counterparties and 
warehouses. Mr. X did not notice any changes in the Bank's approach to transactional 
financing because of Qingdao. Due diligence and compliance processes have 
continued to evolve over the last two years, but in an ordinary course of events rather 
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Appendix 7: Interview with Mr. Y 
Mr. Y is working in the commodity trade finance department (CTF) of a bank in 
Switzerland. He requested to stay anonymous. 
 His department does not engage in repo financing, one of the main reasons 
being that under Swiss regulations, when banks are owners of a commodity, 
they have to set aside so much capital that the return on that product would be 
unsatisfactory. 
 Another major reason is a matter of policy. The bank wants to only engage in 
financing real trading flows and not goods that are immobilized in a warehouse 
for the sole purpose of obtaining finance. In addition, they prefer to be involved 
in transactional deals with durations of 30-90 days as opposed to repos which 
could span over 6 to 12 months. 
 The risks of fraud go up considerably with longer durations and when the goods 
don’t move. In particular, it makes it easier for a warehouse operator to issue a 
duplicate receipt when he knows that the goods will not move for a certain time. 
 Fraud is the main risk in trade finance. Oftentimes, it is not committed with the 
aim of enriching oneself, but as a way to try to get out of a difficult situation. 
Why did the scandal happen in Qingdao 
One of the reasons why it happened there and not somewhere else is because while 
all port authorities lease warehousing facilities to independent operators, in Qingdao, 
the port imposed its own management of the warehouses. At best, the storage 
companies would have a couple of people on the premises, in an office, issuing 
warehouse receipts based on the information provided by the port associates. The 
problem is that this way of functioning was not necessarily disclosed to the traders and 
the lenders who only saw and received a receipt issued by a well-known company. In 
my view, the warehouse receipt should have stated on which basis it was issued and 
contain a wording similar to what we have on container Bills of Lading – “said to 
contain”, because the ship’s master cannot open the containers and see their contents. 
No one really complained, because this practice was being carried out in good faith 
and one would expect that the port authorities could be trusted. Further, these 
conditions were imposed to all participants, so there were not any competitors in a 
better position than yourself. There was an exception, the warehousing firm Steinweg, 
who refused to engage in storage activities under these conditions and insisted on 
 Implications of the Qingdao Metals Scandal for Commodity Repurchase Agreements 
Dmitry MINKO  
 77 
running the warehouse themselves, so they had to do this elsewhere. They had a big 
increase in their business when there was a flight to safety after the scandal. 
Consequences of the scandal 
In the short-term, prices of metals plunged and volumes of imports decreased, also 
because the Chinese regulators, in an effort to curb the phantom metal financing, 
ordered the banks to limit their financing to real trade flows only. Some banks stopped 
doing repos for some time or stopped all business in China for up to six months. 
Did your bank increase interest rates or client margins / decrease advance rates? 
We were not involved in Qingdao and we did not take action in terms of costs or 
leverage. We became more selective in our deals and we now have an additional and 
separate approval process for inventory financing in China, but before that we already 
had extensive due diligence on clients and warehousing companies. 
I have not seen any news saying that the warehouses have been reopened, are 
they still under lockdown? 
It is surprising that the port terminal remains closed down two years after the scandal. 
In Europe, investigations would have been long completed by now, but let us 
remember that we are talking about China. My personal view is that they want people 
to wait and let things calm down. Those who benefit from this are the warehousing 
companies, because when they have a potential huge liability arising from the scandal, 
it gives them time, for those willing to do so, to take out as much assets from their legal 
entity as possible, leaving an empty shell. The lenders are obviously much less content 
with this situation. The investigation’s conclusion on who is responsible is needed in 
order to be able to proceed with litigation and to recover losses. 
Is there something to be done to make the environment in China friendlier to 
warehouse financing? 
The legal environment is difficult, there is no jurisprudence or clarity in this area and 
there are also problems with enforcing claims against Chinese companies and how you 
will be treated in local courts. So there is much to be done, but knowing that fraud is a 
big problem in China, you must be able to decide now with whom do you want to work 
there, if it is only with international companies and so on. 
Do you think that technology can save us? How much hope do you put into new 
electronic instruments such as the LME Shield or Sword systems? 
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There are always advances in technology, the electronic documents can be a solution 
to verify the origin and the authenticity of a document and can help the transactions go 
faster. But this is on the document side, you must remember that there are also the 
physical goods behind the deal and this will not protect you from fraud or 
disappearance of inventory.  
Finally, a detail on accounting treatment – are clients still willing to do repos 
when the off-balance sheet effect cannot be achieved? 
Even in cases when off-balance sheet treatment cannot be achieved, it could still be 
interesting for traders to enter into repos as this structure may be cheaper. 
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Appendix 8: Interview with Mr. Philippe Ziegler 
Mr. Ziegler is Founder and Managing Director of Captiva Corporate Finance SA. He 
was previously Head of Energy & Commodity Finance at BNP Paribas in Switzerland. 
Quelle a été la réaction immédiate des acteurs du marché lorsque le scandale a 
éclaté? 
À ce moment-là, je ne travaillais ni dans une banque, ni une société de négoce, ni en 
Chine, ni chez un transitaire. Si je peux répondre en tant qu’ancien banquier, quand 
vous faites du financement du négoce de matières premières, le risque le plus grand et 
le plus difficile à gérer est celui de fraude. Soit l’on détourne les produits de la vente, 
soit la marchandise, soit la marchandise n’a jamais existé, soit on fait des faux 
documents. Donc ce n’était pas tout à fait une surprise. La deuxième remarque qu’on 
peut faire c’est que le stockage de matières premières est le moment où ce risque est 
le plus grand. Vous avez dû voir qu’en Russie à Rostov il y a eu une fraude il y a 
quelques années avec la société RIAS. L’on a corrompu les propriétaires et les 
ouvriers qui travaillaient au silo pour faire de faux documents disant qu’il y avait des 
céréales alors qu’il n’y en avait pas. Quand une marchandise est sur un bateau, c’est 
difficile qu’elle disparaisse et c’est aussi le cas sur un wagon de chemins de fer.  
Le risque de fraude est aussi lié au pays dans lequel vous faites du stockage. Il faut 
donc être conscient de ces risques et se prévenir en s’assurant que notre client ainsi 
que l’entrepositaire soient sérieux. Toutefois, cela ne suffit pas, c’est pourquoi il existe 
encore d’autres méthodes pour réduire le risque. Une serait de faire contrôler par un 
inspecteur indépendant, un deuxième, l’existence de la marchandise dans l’entrepôt et 
sa conformité au niveau des quantités et de la qualité. On augmente donc le nombre 
d’intervenants, ce qui rajoute des coûts qui pourraient être de l’ordre de 10'000 dollars 
pour 5 ou 10 millions dollars de marchandise, donc ce n’est pas prohibitif. La deuxième 
mesure consiste à ce que l’entrepositaire et la société d’inspection prennent une 
assurance contre la fraude de leurs employés. 
Est-ce qu’il n’a a pas un problème, parce que du moment qu’on a une assurance 
comme cela, il y a une motivation de commettre la fraude? 
On ne dit pas aux employés qu’il y a une assurance. C’est comme quand vous faites 
une assurance-crédit, vous n’avez pas le droit de le dire, sinon il y a une tentation. 
Dans toutes les grandes entreprises il y a une assurance contre la fraude des 
employés, mais on n’en parle pas. 
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Comment est-ce qu’on choisit les entrepositaires avec qui on travaille? 
À BNP Paribas, on visitait tous les entrepositaires et on leur faisait une notation. Avec 
certains c’était interdit de travailler, parce qu’il y avait eu des cas de fraude. D’autres 
étaient trop petits. Si vous déposez votre argent dans une banque, vous devez vous 
assurer qu’elle soit solide. Si vous déposez du métal chez un entrepositaire, c’est la 
même chose. Si l’un des employés fait des faux papiers dans le dos du chef, est-ce 
que la société sera capable de me rembourser? Si vous faites pour un million de 
financement, elle le pourra peut-être. Si vous faites pour 100 millions ou un milliard et 
qu’elle a 50 millions de dollars de fonds propres, vous aurez un problème. 
Est-ce que vous savez s’il y a eu des changements et si oui, lesquels, dans les 
contrats de repos suite à Qingdao? 
Je ne connais pas les détails de ces changements. Afin que le stock ne soit plus 
reconnu dans le bilan du trader, son engagement de racheter la marchandise doit être 
très vague. Il peut y avoir un « strong understanding », mais c’est une option. Si le 
wording de reprendre la marchandise est trop fort, les réviseurs vont remettre le stock 
dans le bilan. En fin de compte, le facteur le plus important reste celui de contrôler 
l’entrepositaire avec qui vous travaillez et s’assurer qu’il soit fiable. Un autre point 
auquel il faut faire attention, c’est de connaître l’origine de la marchandise. Par 
exemple, si on achète de l’aluminium à Rusal et qu’il vient par wagons depuis 
Krasnoyarsk, on le charge sur un bateau à Vladivostok, un B/L est émis, on l’amène en 
Chine et vous recevez des warrants après avoir payé, vous avez une légitimité d’avoir 
acheté cette marchandise. Rusal ne va jamais faire payer trois fois la même cargaison. 
S’il y a un deuxième warrant qui est émis deux semaines plus tard, vous pourrez 
démontrer que c’est votre marchandise parce que vous aurez des justificatifs, alors 
que le détenteur de l’autre warrant ne pourra pas démontrer son origine. 
Est-ce que cela pourrait améliorer les choses en Chine si le gouvernement 
mettait en place un système d’enregistrement de collatéral pour permettre 
d’identifier les marchandises qui ont déjà été nanties? 
Je pense que cela rendrait les choses plus lourdes, plus couteuses, mais je ne suis 
pas sûr que cela réduise le risque de fraude, car ce n’est pas par rapport à si on 
enregistre ou pas, c’est par rapport à l’émission de faux documents, de plusieurs jeux 
de documents. Donc il faut aller sur place pour contrôler lorsque vous les recevez. 
Finalement, pourquoi pas, mais il faudrait une solution qui soit souple, par exemple un 
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système semblable au celui du LME avec lequel on puisse négocier des warrants, cela 
pourrait être bien.  
Est-ce que vous diriez que la situation est revenue à celle d’avant Qingdao, 
«business back to normal»? 
Je ne suis pas un spécialiste de la Chine, mais je serais aussi prudent qu’avant 
Qingdao, même encore plus. Je serais toujours prudent de financer des stocks qui vont 
rester sur place ou qui sont depuis longtemps sur place et qui ne bougent pas.  
Donc ce n’est pas tellement sur le plan des repos eux-mêmes qu’on peut agir, 
mais plutôt sur les conditions de stockage? 
Il faut être dans le marché, connaître ses flux, mais on n’est jamais à l’abri de fraude 
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Appendix 9: Interview with Mr. Samir Zreikat 
Mr. Zreikat is Global Head of Trade Finance at PeaKom SA. In the Commodity Trading 
business since 1986, Mr. Zreikat started in operations, trade finance and shipping and 
then moved to trading and hedging, with now a focus on Finance and Trade Finance.  
Quelle a été la réaction immédiate des acteurs du marché lorsque le scandale a 
éclaté? 
Pour nous c’était juste un cas de fraude de plus à l’étranger dans un marché dans 
lequel nous n’étions pas. Donc cela ne changeait pas notre méthodologie ou notre 
approche. Le marché se disait que ceux à qui c’était arrivé auraient dû savoir que cela 
pouvait se passer et ils n’avaient pas mis en place les bons protocoles de contrôle, 
n’avaient pas les bons partenaires de vérification et ils n’avaient pas forcément fait non 
plus la bonne due diligence concernant leurs contreparties en Chine. 
Est-ce que les banques ont réduit les volumes de financement disponibles ou 
ont augmenté les taux d’intérêts à cause de cet évènement? 
Non, parce qu’une fois de plus, pour elles, cela fait partie de la nature humaine. Ce 
n’était pas une raison d’entrer dans une sorte de paranoïa en se disant que tous les 
traders qui mettent des produits en stock et qui les font financer sont potentiellement 
des criminels. Ce n’est pas cela qui a changé les termes du financement, si n’est que à 
force de voir ces cas se répéter, les collateral management agreements sont devenus 
beaucoup plus chers, parce que les inspecteurs endossent des obligations, donc 
prennent des risques supérieurs et doivent s’impliquer beaucoup plus en étant sur 
place. Les CMA sont devenus beaucoup plus contraignants et les banques sont 
devenues plus exigeantes quant à leur implémentation, si c’est la première fois qu’elles 
les utilisent avec un client. Elles vont commencer par une due diligence extrêmement 
poussée, mais c’était déjà le cas avant Qingdao.  
Est-ce que Qingdao a accéléré cette tendance? 
Pas à ma connaissance, pas dans le marché dans lequel j’étais. Peut-être dans les 
métaux et en Chine, donc c’est un phénomène plutôt localisé, spécifique à un lieu, un 
produit, une contrepartie. 
Est-ce que vous avez des exemples concrets des précautions que les banques 
impliquées auraient pu prendre? 
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Je crois que les banques préfèrent maintenant traiter avec des contreparties contre qui 
elles peuvent faire recours. Il s’agit notamment de voir qui est solvable et suffisamment 
solide financièrement pour pouvoir lui réclamer les 10 millions, 100 millions, x millions 
qu’une négligence de la part de l’inspecteur pourrait leur faire perdre. Cela devient plus 
difficile, parce que les mesures en place sont de plus en plus juridiques, demandent de 
la réassurance et augmentent les tarifs des inspecteurs impliqués dans les CMA. 
Comment expliquer que des banques comme Citibank ou Standard Chartered 
aient pris autant de risques? 
Parce que ce sont principalement des acteurs financiers, pas physiques. Ce ne sont 
pas forcément des gens qui ont l’habitude des risques liés à la manipulation lors du 
stockage ou transport. Eux, ils voient des papiers de plusieurs pages avec des clauses 
que seuls les avocats peuvent maîtriser. Ils mettent en place surtout des montages 
financiers complexes, où ils pensent être couverts grâce à ces clauses qui vont être 
signées avec une contrepartie solide, comme Mercuria. Donc ils pensent avoir tout 
contrôlé essentiellement d’un point de vue formel. Ils oublient qu’il s’agit de matières 
premières dans des pays à risque avec une volatilité de prix qui peut parfois donner la 
tentation à une des parties de frauder pour se faire rapidement de l’argent. Ou cela 
peut être une contrepartie qui a un gros problème de liquidité et elle ne voit pas d’autre 
solution que de frauder. Malheureusement, cela arrive régulièrement. 
Il y a donc une différence d’approche entre les banques comme celles-ci et 
d’autres qui sont des acteurs traditionnels du trade finance… 
Celles qui font du transactionnel sont beaucoup plus proches de la réalité économique, 
logistique, du marché, de ce qu’elles financent. C’est possible qu’un account manager 
voyage avec vous pour venir voir le port et les acteurs locaux. Ceci, à la différence des 
montages structurés où les gens ne sont pas proches des fondamentaux d’exécution 
d’une transaction liée aux matières premières. 
Est-ce que les mesures prises par les banques seront appliquées de façon 
durable, ou bien les choses vont revenir à comment elles étaient avant? 
A mon avis, cela va perdurer. Cela va devenir de plus en plus standardisé, en fait ce 
sera: «oui, bien sûr, on fait du repo financing, voici notre schéma, cela se passe 
comme cela, voici nos coûts. Il faut d’abord remplir toutes les exigences de 
compliance, faire une analyse de risque, vous allez me dire ce que vous voulez que je 
finance et je vais vous dire s’il y a des coches que je peux décocher». Par exemple, si 
c’est un stockage en Europe, on connaît bien, on peut s’y rendre facilement et 
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appliquer des lois. Par contre si c’est dans un pays lointain ou une zone aux 
infrastructures obsolètes et où l’application de la loi est plus « exotique », où la 
corruption est endémique, où des phénomènes climatiques saisonniers pourraient 
rendre la transaction plus risquée (par exemple pour des flux qui passent par la Volga 
qui gèle en hiver), alors l’analyse du risque de financement de la banque change 
complètement. Et si c’est une marchandise périssable, il peut y avoir des problèmes 
liés au stockage ou à sa durée pouvant amener la valeur de la marchandise financée à 
se détériorer rapidement. 
Est-ce que des changements au niveau de la législation en Chine pourraient 
rendre l’environnement plus favorable aux activités de stockage? 
Les Chinois sont extrêmement pragmatiques dans les affaires. Jusqu’à preuve du 
contraire, un document écrit, que ce soit un contrat ou un texte de loi n’est pas la 
priorité pour eux, c’est la logique économique. Il faut se rappeler que c’est un pays soi-
disant communiste avec de l’hyper-libéralisme et plein de contradictions. Si on change 
les lois, je ne sais pas si cela va vraiment changer quelque chose, parce qu’une loi, 
dans certains pays, n’a de valeur que si le gouvernement donne des moyens à son 
exécution. Et on n’est pas en Europe – il y a beaucoup de pays dans le monde où l’on 
change les lois en fonction de ses besoins et sans processus démocratique. Quand 
elles existent, si elles ne nous aident pas, on les oublie et on les interprète aussi un 
peu comme on veut. Donc je ne crois pas que ce soit une solution. 
Si ce n’est pas sur le plan légal, quelles autres solutions pourrait-on mettre en 
place pour améliorer la sécurité du collatéral? 
À un moment donné, on a créé un lieu de stockage le plus sécurisé possible, parce 
qu’on en avait justement assez de voir les stocks disparaitre ou se détériorer. En 
l’occurrence, si je parle de stockage de l’argent, on a créé des banques qui deviennent 
des entrepositaires, mais pour vos économies. Dans le cas des instruments dérivés 
indispensables aux traders pour se prémunir des risques liés à la volatilité des prix, les 
«swaps» ont pris une importance capitale dans les techniques de «hedging». Au début 
c’était de gré-à-gré («over the counter»). Ensuite on a créé des «cleared swaps» au 
travers d’un organisme centralisateur, de contrôle et de sécurisation financière en 
faveur de ses membres (tel que la bourse CME). Ces membres ne peuvent par 
exemple y participer que si leur couverture financière (ou marge) est suffisante pour 
couvrir tout risque de pertes financières de leurs positions de swaps enregistrés dans 
ce marché régulé. Pour en revenir à votre question, l’idée d’un lieu de stockage 
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mutualisé ou reprenant les notions de marges mais pour des matières premières 
entreposées aux noms de plusieurs acteurs-traders serait à développer. 
Sachant que les banques sont plus réticentes à travailler avec des contreparties 
moins connues ou plus petites, vers qui les petites et moyennes sociétés de 
négoce peuvent-elles se tourner lorsqu’elles font face à des difficultés à se 
financer? 
Elles n’ont pas tellement de choix, mais il existe des structures alternatives aux 
banques, sans pouvoir cependant éviter la banque de « trade finance ». Ces structures 
proposent d’apporter le cash requis par la banque qui par exemple recevra ou ouvrira 
une lettre de crédit. Ce sont ces nouveaux partenaires qui couvriront donc la fameuse 
«marge», voire même la presque totalité de la cargaison, comme dans le cas des 
prépaiements de marchandise, soit avant le chargement. Le trader aura néanmoins 
toujours besoin de cash et surtout de crédibilité auprès de cette société alternative. 
Quand le trader se présentera, ce sera un peu comme une séance de speed-dating: 
vous avez un temps limité pour convaincre ce partenaire financier à vous apporter le 
financement dont vous avez besoin. Vous devrez apparaître comme un partenaire de 
confiance, professionnel et aguerri aux types de transactions que vous lui présentez. 
L’avantage pour le trader, si l’affaire se conclut, est que cette société ne fera pas face 
aux mêmes contraintes que les banques et aura certainement un système interne de 
contrôle et validation du risque bien plus souple. Le problème pour le trader sera de 
pouvoir répercuter les coûts financiers élevés de ces «fonds» sur son acheteur. Et si 
sa performance déçoit, ce nouveau partenaire aura vite fait de stopper net sa 
collaboration avec le trader. 
C’est du financement alternatif, ces fonds et sociétés spécialisées ne peuvent se 
substituer à une banque, mais ils peuvent vous apporter cet effet de levier par l’apport 
du cash dont vous avez besoin avec votre banque. 
Les services de ces acteurs seraient plus demandés en Chine après Qingdao? 
C’est possible, mais cela dépend des volumes et valeurs à financer, parce que des 
fonds comme ceux-là ont d’habitude entre 100 et 200 millions de limite maximum de 
crédit, j’en connais certains qui gèrent de 60 à 100 millions, voire plus, ce qui n’est pas 
énorme quand on doit répartir ces fonds parmi plusieurs traders, pour des montants et 
des durées de risque très variés. Ils travaillent donc plutôt avec des sociétés de trading 
de petites tailles aux volumes et risques limités et roulements rapides (30-60 jours de 
financement maximum). Beaucoup se repose sur la confiance envers les compétences 
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et réseaux de leurs clients-traders. J’ai fait appel à l’un de ces fonds lors de mon 
précédent emploi. Je vais certainement les utiliser à nouveau dans mon nouveau job 
parce qu’ils me connaissent et que la confiance est mutuelle. Dans ce domaine, votre 
longévité dépend pour une bonne part de votre réputation. Tricher ou frauder une fois 
sera vite connu par vos pairs et partenaires, c’est un cercle assez restreint. Et si vous 
faites partie de ceux-là, de nombreuses portes, y compris dans le financement, se 
fermeront devant vous! 
Du coup c’est difficile pour les sociétés qui sont des nouveaux arrivants. 
Oui, à moins qu’au niveau des actionnaires et dirigeants il y ait des personnes 
connues, réputées et aux capacités financières importantes. C’est ce que regarderont 
les banques de financement du négoce en premier lieu. 
